PRESS BRIEFING BY MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDENT'S CORONAVIRUS TASK FORCE

Office of the Press Secretary FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE January 31, 2020 PRESS BRIEFING BY MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDENT'S CORONAVIRUS TASK FORCE James S. Brady Press Briefing Room   3:42 P.M. EST SECRETARY AZAR:  Well, good afternoon, everyone.  I'm Alex Azar, Secretary of Health and Human Services, and Chairman of the President's Task Force on the Novel Coronavirus. I'm going to start by turning things over to Dr. Robert Redfield, the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, to discuss the current situation on the novel coronavirus.  Dr. Redfield. DR. REDFIELD:  Thank you, Mr. Secretary.  Let me give you an update on the current situation of the novel coronavirus.  First though, I want to emphasize that this is a serious health situation in China, but I want to emphasize that the risk to the American public currently is low.  Our goal is do all we can do to keep it that way. Second, I want to recognize the concern that the American public may have.  And I want to reiterate what I just said: Currently, the risk of the American public is low. As of today, there are nearly 9,700 cases in China, with more than 200 deaths.  Additionally, currently there are another 23 countries that have confirmed, totally, 132 cases.  This also includes 12 individuals who have been confirmed in six countries who did not travel to China. CDC has launched an aggressive public health response focused on early case recognition, isolation of those cases identified, and contact tracing around those individuals.  This response is a layered response, which includes both targeted airport screening, as well as heightened education and awareness of the American healthcare community to be vigilant in ascertaining the possibility of recent travel to China when they are evaluating patients with upper respiratory tract infection. To date, we have confirmed six cases of this novel virus in the United States.  The most recent case had no travel history to China, but was a close personal contact of one of the previous cases that we had identified through our aggressive contact tracing.  In addition, there are currently 191 individuals that are under investigation. Once again, I want to emphasize that this is a significant global situation, and it continues to evolve.  But I also want to emphasize again that the risk at this time to the American public is low. Mr. Secretary. SECRETARY AZAR:  Thank you, Dr. Redfield.  I would now like to invite Dr. Anthony Fauci, the Director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease, to discuss the underlying rationale for the actions that I will be discussing after he concludes.  Dr. Fauci. DR. FAUCI:  Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.  The concept that's underlying the action that you'll hear about shortly is the issue of the unknown aspects of this particular outbreak.  So let me enumerate just a few of these. I can start off by putting it into perspective by telling you I often get asked -- we have an influenza outbreak here.  We have about 8,000 deaths already.  We have about 100,000 hospitalizations.  Why are we paying such attention?  And why are we doing the kinds of things we're doing here right now? Well, the reason is, despite the morbidity and mortality with influenza, there's a certainty, for example, of seasonal flu.  I can tell you all, guaranteed, that as we get into March and April, the flu cases are going to go down.  You could predict pretty accurately what the range of the mortality is and the hospitalizations, as we've done over the years. The issue now with this is that there's a lot of unknowns. As you can see just from the media, the number of cases have steeply inclined each and every day.  You know that, in the beginning, we were not sure if there were asymptomatic infection, which would make it a much broader outbreak than what we're seeing.  Now we know for sure that there are. It was not clear whether an asymptomatic person could transmit it to someone while they were asymptomatic.  Now we know from a recent report from Germany that that is absolutely the case. There are a number of countries outside of China that have travel-related cases.  And now what we're seeing is that there are secondary cases from them, and, as Bob mentioned, we also have that in this country.  The WHO has issued, as you know, a Public Health Emergency of International Concern declaration. If you put all these things together, I underscore what Bob said: We still have a low risk to the American public, but we want to keep it at a low risk.  And because there are so many unknowns here, we're going to take the action that the Secretary will describe, in a temporary way, to make sure we mitigate, as best as we possibly can, this risk.  Thank you. SECRETARY AZAR:  Thank you, Dr. Fauci.  Today, President Trump took decisive action to minimize the risk of the spread of novel coronavirus in the United States.  Since taking office, President Trump has been clear: His top priority is the safety of the American people.  In addition to the steps that the doctors have outlined, we continue to operationalize a multi-layered, cross-agency, public health response. Following the World Health Organization's decision to declare the 2019 novel coronavirus a Public Health Emergency of International Concern, I have today declared that the coronavirus presents a public health emergency in the United States.  The actions we have taken and continue to take complement -- complement the work of China and the World Health Organization to contain the outbreak within China. In accordance with the declaration, beginning at 5:00 p.m., Eastern Standard Time; Sunday, February the 2nd, the United States government will implement temporary measures to increase our abilities to detect and contain the coronavirus proactively and aggressively.  Any U.S. citizen returning to the United States who has been in Hubei Province in the previous 14 days will be subject to up to 14 days of mandatory quarantine to ensure they are they are provided proper medical care and health screening. To be clear, this applies only to U.S. citizens who have been in Hubei Province in the past 14 days prior to their attempted entry into the United States. Any U.S. citizen returning to the United States who has been in the rest of Mainland China within the previous 14 days will undergo proactive entry health screening at a select number of ports of entry and up to 14 days of monitored self-quarantine to ensure they've not contracted the virus and do not pose a public health risk. Additionally, the President has signed a presidential proclamation, using his authority pursuant to Section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, temporarily suspending the entry into the United States of foreign nationals who pose a risk of transmitting the 2019 novel coronavirus. As a result, foreign nationals, other than immediate family of U.S. citizens and permanent residents, who have traveled in China within the last 14 days will be denied entry into the United States for this time. Once again, these actions will become effective at 5:00 p.m., Eastern Standard Time; Sunday, February 2nd.  These prudent, targeted, and temporary actions will decrease the pressure on public health officials screening incoming travelers, expedite the processing of U.S. citizens and permanent residents returning from China, and ensure resources are focused on the health and safety of the American people. I want to stress: The risk of infection for Americans remains low.  And with these and our previous actions, we are working to keep the risk low.  All agencies are working aggressively to monitor this continually evolving situation and to keep the public informed in a constantly transparent way. The United States appreciates China's efforts and coordination with public health officials across the globe, and continues to encourage the highest levels of transparency. It is likely that we will continue to see more cases in the United States in the coming days and weeks, including some limited person-to-person transmission.  The American public can be assured the full weight of the U.S. government is working to safeguard the health and safety of the American people. I'd now like to invite Deputy Secretary of State Steve Biegun for an update. DEPUTY SECRETARY BEIGUN:  Good afternoon.  And thank you, Secretary Azar.  My name is Steve Biegun, and I am the Deputy Secretary of State, and I represent the State Department on the President's Novel Coronavirus Task Force. Let me describe briefly the role of the Department of State in the proceedings of this task force and our contributions.  Our first responsibility is to monitor events on the ground in China where we have the presence of U.S. diplomats, and to give clear and accurate advice to American citizens and, in particular, American travelers considering visiting or staying in China. In this particular case, this includes identifying any health or safety risks to which they may be subjected, but also, very importantly, identifying their access to essential services such as healthcare in parts of China that are affected by this coronavirus. China has an excellent healthcare system, but, in parts of the country, it is simply overwhelmed and the accessibility to that healthcare for any reason -- including potential infection, but also any other type of accident in need of medical care -- may be compromised during the Chinese government's own treatment of the consequences of this virus. Finally, we also make our judgments based upon any obstacles, particularly obstacles to movement that American citizens might face in the country.  And in China, we have seen barriers to travel, both within and without China, as well as between the United States and China.  And so we've given prudent advice, over the course of the week, to American citizens in order for them -- to allow them to make the best possible choices for themselves. Our second responsibility is to assist U.S. citizens in the affected areas as much as possible.  Because we have a presence on the ground, we can provide advice and, in some cases, we can make other arrangements.  But I want to emphasize this is “as possible,” and we will continue to review what we can do in certain circumstances. Finally, and very importantly, the core mission of the Department of State is to work closely with our international partners.  And in this case, we are working very closely with the Chinese government in order to address a number of related matters. But let me start, on behalf of the President and the Secretary of State, by extending our deepest compassion to the people of China.  This has been a very difficult time for the Chinese people.  It came at a point of their peak holiday season.  Many are affected.  Many have lost loved ones or are enduring the illness of loved ones.  And I want the Chinese people to know that they have the deepest sympathies of the United States of America. Let me also say and echo what Secretary Azar said, which is we are deeply appreciative of the close cooperation we have with the Chinese government as we work together to try to find appropriate ways to address any risks and challenges from this virus. And finally, the United States will continue to cooperate with China in ways that we could potentially provide assistance, including technical assistance, and also, to the extent possible, any critical supplies that the Chinese need in order to address this virus.  And we are working very hard to find donors and make arrangements so that we can -- we can undertake a robust effort to help the Chinese people get their arms around this outbreak. Thank you. SECRETARY AZAR:  Thank you, Secretary Biegun.  Let me -- let me next invite the Acting Deputy Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security Ken Cuccinelli to take the podium for some comments. ACTING DEPUTY SECRETARY CUCCINELLI:  Thank you, Mr. Secretary.  I am Ken Cuccinelli.  I'm the Acting Deputy Secretary at the Department of Homeland Security, and I'm the Department's representative on the task force led by Secretary Azar. Several elements of the Department of Homeland Security are engaged in implementing the medical strategy you heard described here, including Customs and Border Protection, which stands at our land ports, seaports, and airports -- and I'll come back to the airports in a moment -- particularly the Office of Field Operations personnel who you see when you come back into the country from your travels.  They're the first line of defense when you land and come to the country. Additionally engaged is TSA -- the security and the engagement with the airlines.  Our chief medical officer in the department is in CWMD and they're -- we were providing medical support at the airports. So we're using contract authority that we have to backfill the CDC personnel, so they can be freed up for other missions at the airports where medical screening is being focused. FEMA continues to prepare and support HHS preparations themselves.  And then the United States Coast Guard, of course, commands the ports of the United States and deals with incoming shipping, which is obviously slower than the airplanes but coming nonetheless, and we are prepared to deal with each of those. The President's proclamation will have Customs and Border Protection ensuring that United States citizens, legal permanent residents, and their immediate families continue to enter the United States, though they -- those coming from Hubei Province, as you heard from the Secretary, will be subject to quarantine and the others from China to screening. We will be implementing a funneling effort at the airports.  This is done under the authority of the Customs and Border Protection, and it will include seven airports.  So starting five o'clock on Sunday, Eastern Time, incoming flights from China will be funneled through seven airports.  Those airports are JFK, Chicago's O'Hare, in San Francisco, Seattle, Atlanta, Honolulu, and LAX. This is done under CBP's authority.  It will be executed by the Secretary the Department of Homeland Security, consistent with the President's proclamation and in support of that effort -- again, so we can focus the expertise of the medical professionals that will do the screening to implement this. We'll continue to support the medical efforts across the country both at our ports -- our land, sea, and air -- as well as with personnel standing up some of the resiliency measures that HHS has been working on for some time.  Thank you. SECRETARY AZAR:  Thank you, Secretary Cuccinelli.  At this point, we'd be happy to take some of your questions.  Kevin, would you like to get started? Q    Thank you, Mr. Secretary.  If the risk is really low, could you talk about why go to such an extreme as a public health emergency?  If the risk is that low, why are we taking such measures?      SECRETARY AZAR:  So these are actually fairly incremental, measured steps, on top the steps we've already progressively been taking.  You'll notice that many airlines have already stopped direct flights from China.  They have pulled that down.  We're seeing a significant -- and the Department of Transportation could comment on the numbers we're seeing or Homeland Security.  We've seen a significant reduction in people from the U.S. going to China, people from China coming to the U.S., already. This just helps us focus our efforts so that we -- as we're dealing with the unknowns that Dr. Fauci spoke about earlier -- unknowns around incubation period, unknowns about the speed of transmissibility, unknowns about asymptomatic transmission, unknowns about severity -- that we take appropriate, measured, prudential steps so we can focus our resources.  Because it's the bread and butter -- I've talked to you before about -- the bread and butter of public health is: identify people who might be symptomatic or might have the disease, diagnose, isolate, treat, contact trace. That's a significant undertaking, as we have already done with the six individuals in the United States who've been positively identified.  We have to focus those resources.      John.    Q    Mr. Secretary, the mandatory quarantine for people coming in Hubei Province -- will that be home quarantine or will that be in an institutional setting? SECRETARY AZAR:  That would be at an appropriate quarantine facility of some kind for those individuals.  For the U.S. citizens returning to the United States from having been in China within the previous 14 days, they would be funneled, as Secretary Cuccinelli spoke of; they would be screened appropriately to see if they present any type of symptoms of the disease; and then they would be asked to self-isolate at home over the 14 days. But for individuals from Hubei -- because that is the epicenter of this, with such high immediate transmission -- we feel that these additional measures of quarantine for up to 14 days are appropriate. Q    And can I just follow that: Have you selected specific quarantine centers? SECRETARY AZAR:  We have selected them.  We're -- we will announce those as DHS implements, with the airlines, that funneling activity. Q    To follow up on John, what does self-quarantine look like for the people who are self-quarantining?  How do you enforce that?  What are the mechanisms surrounding that? And if you could you also speak to -- you just described this as sort of an incremental step, I believe.  This is obviously significant: the quarantine of citizens in this country. What is your message to Americans who are watching this on the news, who are seeing this, who are feeling really alarmed by the steps that this administration is taking and by the spread of coronavirus in general?  They hear you say the risk is low, but then they see this action being taken, and I think some people might be freaked out by that. SECRETARY AZAR:  I hope not.  I hope that people will see that their government is taking responsible steps to protect them.  These are -- these are preventive steps.  The risk is low in the United States.  The risk is low of transmissibility, the risk of contracting the disease is low, but our job is to keep that risk low, as much as we can, by taking appropriate preventative steps. So that's -- that's the approach we're taking. Let me ask Dr. Redfield if he can talk a bit about -- we -- this is -- we do this type of quarantine and self-isolation work basically every day, working very closely -- I want to stress something that we've not mentioned enough -- working very closely with our state and local public health partners.  They're -- just as we do with emergency response, we serve as a backup and expertise and a border-type force, but the state and local authorities are the backbone of our public health infrastructure and we work with them to daily to help with our quarantine stations and activities. So, Dr. Redfield, could you talk a bit about self-isolation? DR. REDFIELD:  Thank you, Mr. Secretary.  Clearly, we've stratified the risk groups here, as it was already alluded to, from Hubei Province, where there really is aggressive transmission.  Those individuals are going to come and be required to have 14 days of -- up to 14 days of (inaudible) transmission. Then, there's a large category of individuals coming back to China.  As we stand here today, over half of the reported cases in China now are not in Hubei, but when you look at their history it's -- they got infected -- probably over 80, 85 percent of them got infected from Hubei. Those individuals will then be actively screened when they come into one of the seven airports, for significant risk, as well as any evidence of any symptoms.  In the absence of any reason to advance them into a clinical evaluation at that port of entry, they will be allowed to complete their travel back to their home, where they then will be monitored by the local health departments in a self-monitoring situation their home. We did this in the West Africa Ebola outbreak. Q    That sounds Ebola.  Right. DR. REDFIELD:  We did it in the -- but I want to emphasize: At that time, over 98 percent of the American public voluntarily accepted the importance of this.  And we think and we continue to believe the American public will see this as something to their benefit, to their family’s benefit, obviously their community's benefit.  So that's the current situation. DR. FAUCI:  There’s one other aspect of this that I think is important.  Very recently, there was a case of a woman who was in China, and came to Germany, and had an interaction -- professional interaction -- with a professional partner. She had no symptoms at the time.  She went back to China and got sick.  This individual, with whom she had an interaction, contracted the coronavirus at a time that she had no symptoms.  He then transmitted it to two of his colleagues, so they now have four cases.  One of the problems with when the virus is transmitted in an asymptomatic way and has its implications -- it puts a terrible burden on the screening process.  How do you screen somebody? You know, remember back with Ebola?  Ebola doesn't get transmitted unless you're actively very ill, and you know that. It's very, very clear.  When you can transmit a virus at a time when you're asymptomatic, that just puts that extra burden on screening.  And as a lot of people come in, it's going to be very difficult. Q    Dr. Fauci, can I follow up on that?  I -- just what he was just saying.  Given that Germany data that you just cited, are the 195 people being quarantined right now -- are they getting tested every day for coronavirus? SECRETARY AZAR: Let’s ask Dr. Redfield to describe their care. DR. REDFIELD:  Clearly, they're all isolated and will be for the 14 days.  We have done virus isolation, but I want to be clear: The current tests that we developed at CDC is not -- we're not sure of the natural history of how the virus is isolated.  Can you isolate it one day, then three days later you can’t?  And we are seeing -- in the cases that are in the hospital, we've seen people who had detectable virus, then they didn't have detectable virus, and then three days later they had detectable virus.  We're using the virus cultures right now in these individuals more to help us learn about this virus.  How much asymptomatic carriage, in fact, is there?  So I want people to understand that distinction.  We're not using it as a release criteria because we don't know the natural history of how this virus is secreted, and this is what we're continuing to learn. Q    And are you comfortable that the thousands of people that pass through the U.S. screening so far are not car- -- that  they don't have coronavirus? DR. REDFIELD:  So this is why it's such a layered approach.  We are going to see additional cases in this country.  We've already seen, in the six cases we’ve defined: A number of them came in asymptomatic.  So this is why we have that multi-layered approach and have really worked hard to engage the medical community in the United States. Of the six cases that we diagnosed so far, one was picked up by hospi- -- airport screening.  Four were picked up by astute doctors.  And the most recent one was picked up by CDC doing aggressive contact tracing.      Q    Thank you, Mr. Secretary.  Jeff Mason from Reuters.  Can you -- you referenced airlines earlier.  Can you or your colleague from the Department of Transportation give us an update on the administration's thinking about a travel ban on airlines, in general, being prohibitive for flying to and from China? ASSISTANT SECRETARY SZABAT:  There is no travel ban -- Joel Szabat, Assistant Secretary of Department of Transportation.  I think many of you who've been following this are aware: All of the three U.S. carriers who’ve flying between the U.S. and China have announced that they are taking down all of their passenger flights, and they announced that before any action by the administration. So we are working closely with our counterparts in the -- our Chinese aviation counterparts.  And we’ll be working, going forward, with both the U.S. and the Chinese passenger airlines about their flight plans going forward. Q    Are you considering more drastic action beyond the voluntary measures that the airlines have taken so far? ASSISTANT SECRETARY SZABAT:  As Secretary Azar mentioned earlier, this is an evolving situation -- but, at the moment, no. SECRETARY AZAR:  Would you mind giving some numbers on -- I don’t know if you or Ken can talk a bit about what we’re seeing on air traffic numbers, perhaps. ASSISTANT SECRETARY SZABAT:  So I'll start it off and then turn over to Acting Deputy Secretary Cuccinelli. So, in terms of passengers traveling between United States and China, as you might expect, over the course of the last couple of weeks, the passengers loading in the U.S. to fly to China have dropped to almost none.  Passengers continue to have a high, what we call, “load factor” -- a high rate of passengers coming from China to United States.  However -- so the U.S. carriers, though, as they’re (inaudible) they represent just under 40 percent of the passenger capability. So with that, we have been seeing already, in the course of the last week to 10 days, a significant decrease in the number of passengers that have been going between United States and China.  And the Department of Homeland Security does an excellent job of tracking those numbers day to day. ACTING DEPUTY SECRETARY CUCCINELLI:  So, just to speak to the numbers: Since the Chinese have locked down Wuhan and the Hubei Province -- which was eight days ago, if memory serves -- travel from China to the United States, as of yesterday, had dropped by close to 20 percent Travel from the United States to China had dropped by well more than 50 percent, and this is with the sort of market response that Joel referenced by the airlines and the voluntary actions taken by travelers. I would note for you all that it's not a lot of data, but over the last five days, the number of American citizens traveling from China back to the United States has been rising.  So even while the total number is going down, it does look to us, initially, like Americans, at least some of them, are returning back home. Q    Dr. Fauci, how confident are you in the accuracy of these tests?  If somebody is testing negative and then they later test positive, can you have confidence, if you're testing negative for something, that you don't have it? DR. FAUCI:  So, you mean -- I think the question you ask is really one of the fundamental bases of why this decision was made.  If we had an absolutely accurate test that was very sensitive and very specific, then we could just test people and say, “Okay, we're good to go.” I want to get back to that broad concept that I mentioned when I made my brief introduction about the unknowns.  We don't know the accuracy of this test.  We haven't done enough -- people who came in with negative, then all sudden they were positive.  You could have virus in your nasal secretions or you couldn't and still be infected.  I mean, it isn't like it's a horrible test, but it is not a test that's absolute. I spoke to a reporter the other day, talking about tests.  So when you're talking about HIV, if a person has HIV and I draw their blood, I can tell you 100 percent whether they have HIV or not -- 100 percent.  That's not even near where we are with this. Q    You talk about a gradual approach, Mr. Secretary, in terms of what you're doing right now.  What measures do you have, sort of, in the toolkit if this gets worse? SECRETARY AZAR:  Well, let me ask, perhaps, Dr. Kadlec to talk a bit about our approach.  Obviously, at this point, as I’ve said, the risk here in the United States is quite low for any individual.  The risk is low.  Our job is to work to keep that that way. But we have public health tools that we use, we exercise constantly in the event of larger-scale infectious disease outbreaks.  And that's what we would -- that what we would rely on should we end up seeing more cases in the United States.  But it's exactly these measures that help make any additional cases more manageable to use the tools Dr. Kadlec will talk about. DR. KADLEC:  Well, thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.  And my role in this is really precautionary at this stage.  And everything that's been done at this point has been incremental, proportionate, and precautionary.  And so my responsibilities are to work across the federal government, as well as within HHS, to ensure that we're postured should this virus, kind of, continue to expand. And so, domestically, we're working on -- working with our private sector healthcare preparedness.  We're working specifically around supply chain resilience because much of our healthcare products come from overseas.  And we're also working actively with NIH and our DOD colleagues, as well as our DARPA colleagues and the private industry to develop better diagnostics, possible therapeutics, as well as vaccines, which Dr. Fauci can speak more about. So we're really taking a very -- I wouldn't say cautious -- but deliberate and methodical approach to ensure that, come what may, we’re prepared.  Thank you. SECRETARY AZAR:  Kristen. AIDE:  I’m going to call the last question so that we can ensure we get you guys out for departure.  So last question. SECRETARY AZAR:  Kristen. Q    Any concerns about legal challenges, international travel, in general, to the region?  What's the message to people who need to travel to the region, and what benchmark will you have for when this gets lifted? SECRETARY AZAR:  So let me ask Dr. Redfield if he could talk a bit about -- just giving your assessment as a health professional about international travel generally.  And then the types of factors -- maybe for Dr. Fauci -- that we'll be looking at as we, again, temp- -- hopefully, temporary measures, titrated, try to just keep a pause on the situation. DR. REDFIELD:  Thank you, Mr. Secretary.  I think, as Dr. Fauci said, right now there's a lot of unknowns.  Obviously, almost every other day, we're learning something we didn't the day before about this.  And we’ll continue to do that. Probably the most important thing, from our perspective, is whether or not there's expansion of what I call “sustained community human-to-human transmission.”  Right now, that is limited, in large part, to Hubei area and the broader China. We've had some isolated human-to-human transmission in some of the cases that have gone internationally.  I mentioned we've had 12 so far that have been defined in the whole world.  So that's going to be important to see if there's broadening of sustained human-to-human transmission.  I think that's going to really be the major -- the major thing that we're going to be looking. And, as the Secretary said, these precautionary messages and actions that have been put out today, it really is intended to keep this virus from causing significant consequences to the American public. SECRETARY AZAR:  Thank you all very much.  And again, I just want to stress: First, the most important thing that we can be doing is what we are doing, which is offering to help the Chinese government and assist them in helping them to control the spread of the novel coronavirus in China -- working with them as closely as possible, as well as with the World Health Organization. Second, the risk to Americans is low.  You have a team here.  You have an experienced, first-class -- the world's best public healthcare system, infrastructure, and professionals looking out for you, making judgments like this, scaling them up, as appropriate, to work to keep this from becoming an issue that would be of concern for you -- to keep that risk low. So thank you all very much.                          END                 4:16 P.M. EST

Proclamation on National African American History Month, 2020

Office of the Press Secretary FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE January 31, 2020 NATIONAL AFRICAN AMERICAN HISTORY MONTH, 2020 - - - - - - - BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA A PROCLAMATION        Through bravery, perseverance, faith, and resolve -- often in the face of incredible prejudice and hardship -- African Americans have enhanced and advanced every aspect of American life.  Their fight for equality, representation, and respect motivates us to continue working for a more promising, peaceful, and hopeful future for every American.  During National African American History Month, we honor the extraordinary contributions made by African Americans throughout the history of our Republic, and we renew our commitment to liberty and justice for all.      The theme of this year's observance, "African Americans and the Vote," coincides with the 150th anniversary of the 15th Amendment, which gave African American men the right to vote.  This Amendment to the Constitution, ratified in 1870, prohibits the government from denying or abridging a citizen's right to vote based on "race, color, or previous condition of servitude."  Today, this guarantee is enforced primarily throughout the Voting Rights Act of 1965, an enduring legacy of Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Civil Rights movement.      This year also marks the 150th anniversary of the first African American to serve in the Congress.  In 1870, Hiram Revels, a Mississippi Republican, served a 1-year term in the Senate, where he fought for justice and racial equality.  During his lifetime, Senator Revels served as a military chaplain, a minister with the African Methodist Episcopal Church, and a college administrator.  But it was Revels' tenure in the Congress that truly distinguished him as a trailblazer.  He made history serving our Nation in a building that had been constructed by slave laborers just a decade earlier.      My Administration has made great strides in expanding opportunity for people of all backgrounds.  Over the past 2 years, the poverty and unemployment rates for African Americans have reached historic lows.  Through the transformative Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, more than 8,700 distressed communities battling economic hardship have been designated Opportunity Zones, creating a path for struggling communities to unlock investment resources and create much needed jobs and community amenities.  I also signed into law the historic First Step Act, which rolled back unjust provisions of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which disproportionately harmed African American communities.  The First Step Act provides inmates with opportunities for job training, education, and mentorship.  We want every person leaving prison to have the tools they need to take advantage of a second chance to transform their lives and pursue the American dream after incarceration.  Additionally, last December, I was proud to sign into law the groundbreaking FUTURE Act, which ensures full support for historically black colleges and universities over the next 10 years.      Our great Nation is strengthened and enriched by citizens of every race, religion, color, and creed.  This month, we celebrate the cultural heritage, diverse contributions, and unbreakable spirit of African Americans.  We commend the heroes, pioneers, and common Americans who tirelessly fought for -- and firmly believed in -- the promise of racial equality granted by our Creator, enshrined in our Constitution, and enacted into our laws.  We pledge to continue to stand against the evils of bigotry, intolerance, and hatred so that we may continue in our pursuit of a more perfect Union.      NOW, THEREFORE, I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim February 2020 as National African American History Month.  I call upon public officials, educators, and all Americans to observe this month with appropriate programs, ceremonies, and activities.      IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this thirty-first day of January, in the year of our Lord two thousand twenty, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and forty-fourth.                              DONALD J. TRUMP  ###

TEXT OF A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE CHAIRMEN OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEES ON ARMED SERVICES, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, CHAIRWOMAN OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, AND THE CHAIRMEN OF THE SENATE COMMITTEES ON ARMED SERVICES, APPROPRIATIONS, FOREIGN RELATIONS, AND SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

Office of the Press Secretary FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE January 31, 2020 TEXT OF A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE CHAIRMEN OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEES ON ARMED SERVICES, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, CHAIRWOMAN OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, AND THE CHAIRMEN OF THE SENATE COMMITTEES ON ARMED SERVICES, APPROPRIATIONS, FOREIGN RELATIONS, AND SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE January 31, 2020 Dear Mr. Chairman:  (Dear Madam Chairwoman:) In accordance with section 1264 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115-91), as amended, I am transmitting notice on a change made to the Legal and Policy Frameworks Guiding the United States' Use of Military Force and Related National Security Operations.                              Sincerely,                                   DONALD J. TRUMP   ###

Ensuring Safe & Lawful E-Commerce for US Consumers, Businesses, Government Supply Chains, and Intellectual Property Rights

Office of the Press Secretary FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE January 31, 2020

EXECUTIVE ORDER - - - - - - - ENSURING SAFE AND LAWFUL E-COMMERCE FOR UNITED STATES CONSUMERS, BUSINESSES, GOVERNMENT SUPPLY CHAINS, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS HOLDERS     By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:       Section 1.  Policy.    E-commerce, including transactions involving smaller express-carrier or international mail packages, is being exploited by traffickers to introduce contraband into the United States, and by foreign exporters and United States importers to avoid applicable customs duties, taxes, and fees.     It is the policy of the United States Government to protect consumers, intellectual property rights holders, businesses, and workers from counterfeit goods, narcotics (including synthetic opioids such as fentanyl), and other contraband now being introduced into the United States as a result of the recent growth in e-commerce.  The United States Government must also protect the revenue of the United States from individuals and entities who evade customs duties, taxes, and fees.     It is the policy of the United States Government that any person who knowingly, or with gross negligence, imports, or facilitates the importation of, merchandise into the United States in material violation of Federal law evidences conduct of so serious and compelling a nature that it should be referred to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) of the Department of Homeland Security for a determination whether such conduct affects that person's present responsibility to participate in transactions with the Federal Government.     It is the policy of the United States Government, as reflected in Executive Order 12549 of February 18, 1986 (Debarment and Suspension), and elsewhere, to protect the public interest and ensure the integrity of Federal programs by transacting only with presently responsible persons.  In furtherance of this policy, the nonprocurement debarment and suspension system enables executive departments and agencies to exclude from Federal programs persons who are not presently responsible.  CBP implements this system by suspending and debarring persons who flout the customs laws, among other persons who lack present responsibility.  To achieve the policy goals stated herein, the United States Government shall consider all appropriate actions that it can take to ensure that persons that CBP suspends or debars are excluded from participating in the importation of merchandise into the United States.     It is the policy of the United States Government that express consignment operators, carriers, hub facilities, international posts, customs brokers, and other entities, including e-commerce platform operators, should not facilitate importation involving persons who are suspended or debarred by CBP.     It is the policy of the United States Government to ensure that parcels containing contraband be kept outside of the United States to the greatest extent possible and that all parties who participate in the introduction or attempted introduction of such parcels into the United States be held accountable under the laws of the United States.     Sec. 2.  Criteria for the Importer of Record Program, Including Exclusion of Trade Violators.    (a)  The Secretary of Homeland Security shall issue a notice of proposed rulemaking to establish criteria importers must meet in order to obtain an importer of record number.     (b)  Such criteria shall include a criterion providing that any person debarred or suspended by CBP for lack of present responsibility for reasons related to importation or trade shall be ineligible to obtain an importer of record number for the duration of such person's suspension or debarment by CBP.     Sec. 3.  Responsibilities of Express Consignment Operators, Carriers, Hub Facilities, and Licensed Customs Brokers.    (a)  Consistent with applicable law, the Secretary of Homeland Security, through the Commissioner of CBP, shall take steps to ensure that, within 60 days of the publication in the System for Award Management by CBP of the name of any debarred or suspended person, express consignment operators, carriers, hub facilities, and licensed customs brokers notify CBP of any attempt, of which they know or have reason to believe, by any persons who may not obtain an importer of record number based on any criteria established by the Secretary under section 2 of this order, to re-establish business activity requiring an importer of record number through a different name or address associated with the debarred or suspended person.     (b)  The Secretary of Homeland Security, through the Commissioner of CBP, shall consider appropriate measures, consistent with applicable law, to ensure that express consignment operators, carriers, hub facilities, and licensed customs brokers cease to facilitate business activity that requires an importer of record number by any person who may not obtain an importer of record number, as provided by any criteria established by the Secretary under section 2 of this order.  Depending on the criteria established, such consideration shall include whether CBP may take any of the following measures:  limiting an express consignment operator's, carrier's, or hub facility's participation in any CBP trusted trader programs; taking appropriate action with regard to an express consignment operator's, carrier's, or hub facility's operating privileges; or suspending or revoking a customs broker's license.     Sec. 4.  Items Sent to the United States through the International Postal Network.   (a)  The United States Postal Service (USPS) should collaborate with the Secretary of State to notify the international postal network, via circular or the functional equivalent, of the policy of the United States Government set forth in section 1 of this order and the key provisions of this order.  USPS should make all reasonable efforts to include provisions regarding any criteria for participating in the importer of record program established under section 2 of this order in any new contractual instruments it executes with international posts.     (b)  Within 90 days from the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland Security, through the Commissioner of CBP, and in consultation with USPS, shall submit to the President a report on any appropriate measures the Federal Government could take, including negotiating with international posts, to prevent the importation or attempted importation into the United States through the international postal network of shipments containing goods, when such importation or attempted importation is known to have been facilitated by any person who may not obtain an importer of record number under any criteria established by the Secretary under section 2 of this order.     Sec. 5.  Non-Compliant International Posts.    (a)  The Secretary of Homeland Security, through the Commissioner of CBP, and in consultation with the United States Trade Representative, shall develop an International Mail Non-Compliance metric, based on relevant factors, to formulate an overall compliance score for each international post.  This score shall take into account rates of trafficking of counterfeit goods, narcotics (including synthetic opioids such as fentanyl), and other contraband through a particular international post, effectiveness of the international post in reducing such trafficking, including cooperation with CBP, as well as such other factors the Secretary, through the Commissioner, determines advisable.  The Secretary shall update overall compliance scores on a quarterly basis.  The Secretary shall determine a minimum threshold compliance score for each quarter and shall deem non compliant any international post that scores below such threshold in that quarter.     (b)  The Secretary of Homeland Security shall prioritize targeted inspection of imports into the United States from any international post that for two or more consecutive quarters is deemed a non-compliant international post.     (c)  Consistent with applicable law, the Secretary of Homeland Security, through the Commissioner of CBP, in consultation with USPS, may require additional information for any shipment from any international post that for six or more consecutive quarters is deemed a non compliant international post.  The Secretary of Homeland Security, through the Commissioner of CBP, shall, to the extent consistent with applicable law and international agreements, implement all appropriate measures to prevent importation into the United States of any shipments dispatched from any international post that is deemed a non-compliant international post for six or more consecutive quarters and for which the additional information required consistent with this subsection is not promptly provided.  USPS should collaborate with CBP in implementing these measures.     (d)  The Secretary of Homeland Security, through the Commissioner of CBP, and in consultation with USPS, shall, to the maximum extent permitted by applicable law, take measures to protect the United States from shipments from any international post that for eight or more consecutive quarters is deemed a non-compliant international post.  To the extent consistent with applicable law and as appropriate, such measures might include preventing the importation into the United States of shipments dispatched from such posts, regardless of whether additional information required by CBP is provided.  Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland Security, through the Commissioner of CBP, and in consultation with USPS, shall submit a report to the President analyzing what measures CBP may take consistent with its existing authorities.     (e)  Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland Security, through the Commissioner of CBP, shall publish and regularly update appropriate guidance related to CBP's implementation of this section, including the process by which an international post is deemed a non-compliant international post and the process by which an international post is removed from the list of non-compliant international posts.     Sec. 6.  Publication of Violation Information; Enhanced Enforcement Efforts.   (a)  On a periodic basis, and consistent with Federal law and executive branch policy reflecting non disclosure of sensitive information, the Secretary of Homeland Security, through the Commissioner of CBP and the Director of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, shall publish information about seizures arising in the international mail and express consignment environments that involve intellectual property rights violations, illegal drugs and other contraband, incorrect country of origin, under valuation, or other violations of law of particular concern.  In determining which information to publish, the Secretary shall give greatest consideration to repeat offenses affecting priority trade issues as defined in 19 U.S.C. 4322.     (b)  Within 60 days of the date of this order, the Attorney General shall assign appropriate resources to ensure that Federal prosecutors accord a high priority to prosecuting offenses related to import violations as described in this order, including, as appropriate and within existing appropriations, increasing the number of Department of Justice officials who will enforce criminal or civil laws, as appropriate, related to the importation of merchandise.     Sec. 7.  Report on Sufficiency of Fees.    Within 210 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the heads of other executive departments and agencies, as appropriate, shall submit a report to the President, through the Director of the Office of Management and Budget:     (a)  analyzing whether the fees collected by CBP are currently set at a sufficient level to reimburse the Federal Government's costs associated with processing, inspecting, and collecting duties, taxes, and fees for parcels; and     (b)  providing recommendations, consistent with applicable law, regarding any fee adjustments that are necessary to reimburse the Federal Government's costs associated with processing, inspecting, and collecting duties, taxes, and fees for parcels.     Sec. 8.  Definitions.    For the purposes of this order:     (a)  "Customs broker" has the meaning given to that term in 19 U.S.C. 1641(a)(1).     (b)  "Express consignment operator, carrier, or hub facility" has the meaning given to those terms in 19 CFR 128.1.     (c)  "International post" means any foreign public or private entity providing various types of postal services, including mailing and delivery services.     (d)  "Contraband" has the meaning given to that term in 49 U.S.C. 80302(a), and also means any goods or merchandise otherwise prohibited from importation or entry under the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended.     (e)  "E-commerce platform" means any web-based platform that includes features primarily designed for arranging the sale, purchase, payment, or shipping of goods, or that enables sellers not directly affiliated with an operator of a web-based platform to sell physical goods through the web to consumers located in the United States.     (f)  "Person" means any individual, corporation, partnership, association, or legal entity, however organized.     Sec. 9.  General Provisions.    (a)  Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:         (i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or         (ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.     (b)  This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.     (c)  This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.                         DONALD J. TRUMP   THE WHITE HOUSE,     January 31, 2020. ###

Office of the Press Secretary FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE January 31, 2020 Statement from the Press Secretary   Defending American lives and safety is the President’s highest duty.    Pursuant to Presidential Proclamation 9645, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security submitted to the President a report—drafted in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Director of National Intelligence—on global compliance with standards established for the screening and vetting of foreign nationals seeking to come to the United States.  As set forth in Presidential Proclamation 9645, countries that fail to conduct proper identity management protocols and procedures, or that fail to provide information necessary to comply with basic national security requirements—including sharing terrorist, criminal, or other identity information—face the risk of restrictions and limitations on the entry of their nationals into the United States.    Today, following the recommendations provided by Members of his Cabinet and his advisors, President Donald J. Trump has issued a proclamation maintaining entry restrictions on certain nationals of Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, Yemen, and Somalia; suspending the overseas issuance of immigrant visas for certain nationals of Burma (Myanmar), Eritrea, Kyrgyzstan, and Nigeria; and suspending participation in the “Visa Lottery” for certain nationals of Sudan and Tanzania.  The new restrictions will not apply to tourist, business, or other nonimmigrant travel.  The Administration will work with the non-compliant countries to bring them into compliance with United States security standards.   It is fundamental to national security, and the height of common sense, that if a foreign nation wishes to receive the benefits of immigration and travel to the United States, it must satisfy basic security conditions outlined by America’s law-enforcement and intelligence professionals.  Proclamation 9645 was reviewed and upheld as lawful by the Supreme Court.  President Trump’s security and travel proclamations have immeasurably improved our national security, substantially raised the global standard for information-sharing, and dramatically strengthened the integrity of the United States’ immigration system.  The orders have been a tremendous and vital success.   BACKGROUND: Section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act provides: “Suspension of entry or imposition of restrictions by President Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate.” ###

Proclamation on Improving Enhanced Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry

Office of the Press Secretary FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE January 31, 2020

IMPROVING ENHANCED VETTING CAPABILITIES AND PROCESSES FOR DETECTING ATTEMPTED ENTRY INTO THE UNITED STATES BY TERRORISTS OR OTHER PUBLIC-SAFETY THREATS - - - - - - -   BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA A PROCLAMATION       In Executive Order 13780 of March 6, 2017 (Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States), I temporarily suspended entry of nationals of certain specified countries and ordered a worldwide review of whether the United States would need additional information from each foreign country to assess adequately whether nationals of that foreign country seeking to enter the United States pose a security or public-safety threat to the United States, and if so, what additional information was needed.  The Secretary of Homeland Security, pursuant to Executive Order 13780 and in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, developed an assessment model using three categories of criteria to assess national security and public-safety threats:  whether a foreign government engages in reliable identity-management practices and shares relevant information; whether a foreign government shares national security and public-safety information; and whether a country otherwise poses a national security or public-safety risk.     Following a comprehensive worldwide review of the performance of approximately 200 countries using these criteria, the Secretary of Homeland Security presented the results of this review, focusing in particular on those countries that were deficient or at risk of becoming deficient in their performance under the assessment criteria.  After a subsequent period of diplomatic engagement on these issues by the Department of State, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security submitted a report in September 2017, which found that eight countries were hindering the ability of the United States Government to identify threats posed by foreign nationals attempting to enter the United States.  The Secretary of Homeland Security then recommended that I impose travel restrictions on certain nationals of those countries.  After consultation with relevant Cabinet officials and appropriate Assistants to the President, I issued Proclamation 9645 of September 24, 2017 (Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats).     In Proclamation 9645, I suspended and limited the entry into the United States of certain nationals of eight countries that failed to satisfy the criteria and were unable or unwilling to improve their information sharing, or that otherwise presented serious terrorism-related risks.  Those travel restrictions remain in effect today, with one exception.  On April 10, 2018, I issued Proclamation 9723 (Maintaining Enhanced Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats), removing travel restrictions on nationals of the Republic of Chad.  Chad had improved its identity-management and information-sharing practices by taking steps to issue more secure passports and by increasing the integrity of how its government handles lost and stolen passports.  Chad also began to share information about known or suspected terrorists in a manner that makes that information available to the United States screening and vetting programs, and it created a new, standardized process for the United States to request relevant criminal information.     Pursuant to my directives in section 4 of Proclamation 9645, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has continued to assess every 180 days and report to me on whether the interests of the United States require the suspension of or limitation on entry of certain classes of foreign nationals.  DHS has also continued to assess ways to further improve its processes for measuring how countries perform under the assessment criteria.  From July 2018 through August 2019, DHS updated its methodology to assess compliance with the assessment criteria, which has allowed for more in-depth analysis and yields even more granularity and increased accuracy regarding each country's performance under the criteria.     In this updated methodology, the general overall criteria for review have not changed.  The United States Government still expects all foreign governments to share needed identity-management information, to share national security and public-safety information, and to pass a security and public-safety risk assessment.  Building on experience and insight gained over the last 2 years, DHS has, however, refined and modified the specific performance metrics by which it assesses compliance with the above criteria.  For example, while the prior model determined whether a country shares certain needed information, the revised model accounts for how frequently the country shares that information and the extent to which that data contributes to border and immigration screening and vetting.  As another example, the prior system asked whether a country issued electronic passports at all, whereas the refined metrics assess whether a country issues electronic passports for all major classes of travel documents.  Similarly, the lost and stolen passports criterion previously assessed whether a country had prior instances of reporting loss or theft to the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), whereas the revised model now assesses whether the country has reported lost or stolen passports to INTERPOL within 30 days of a report of a loss or theft.     The DHS improvements to the assessment criteria also involve additional, and more customized, data from the United States Intelligence Community.  DHS's original evaluation under Executive Order 13780 relied on existing intelligence products to assess the threat from each country.  With the benefit of 2 years of experience, DHS has worked closely with the Intelligence Community to define intelligence requirements and customize intelligence reporting that offers a detailed characterization of the relative risk of terrorist travel to the United States from each country in the world.  This additional detail improves DHS's assessment of national security and public-safety risk.     In addition, DHS greatly increased the amount of information obtained from United States Embassies abroad, which work closely with foreign governments.  United States Embassies are best positioned to understand their host countries' ability and willingness to provide information to the United States, and United States Embassies' assessments contribute to a clearer understanding of how well a foreign government satisfies the assessment criteria.  DHS also consolidated statistical information on operational encounters with foreign nationals.  This information speaks to the frequency with which a country's nationals commit offenses while in the United States or otherwise develop grounds for inadmissibility under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).     Finally, as more precise, granular data became available, it became clear that many countries were only partially implementing each criterion.  The 2017 process had three basic potential compliance ratings for each criterion:  in compliance, out of compliance, or unknown.  The updated methodology allows the United States to account for ways in which countries partially comply with the metrics associated with each criterion.  As a result, for example, countries that DHS assessed in the 2017 review have now received more nuanced, partial compliance ratings.  In addition, the process now weighs each criterion and risk factor based on its degree of importance to the United States Government for conducting screening and vetting of visa applicants and other travelers to the United States.     Using this enhanced review process, DHS conducted its most recent, worldwide review pursuant to Proclamation 9645 between March 2019 and September 2019.  The process began on March 11, 2019, when the United States Government formally notified all foreign governments (except for Iran, Syria, and North Korea) about the refined performance metrics for the identity-management and information-sharing criteria.  After collecting information from foreign governments, multilateral organizations, United States Embassies, Federal law enforcement agencies, and the Intelligence Community, multiple subject matter experts reviewed each country's data and measured its identity-management and information-sharing practices against the criteria.  DHS then applied the data to an algorithm it developed to consistently assess each country's compliance with the criteria.     DHS identified the worst-performing countries for further interagency review and for an assessment of the potential impact of visa restrictions.  As in the worldwide review culminating in Proclamation 9645, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security assessed that Iraq did not meet the baseline for compliance.  As part of the interagency review process, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security determined, however, not to recommend entry restrictions and limitations for nationals of Iraq.  In his report, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security recognized a close cooperative relationship between the United States and the democratically elected government of Iraq, the strong United States diplomatic presence in Iraq, the significant presence of United States forces in Iraq, and Iraq's commitment to combating the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).  The Acting Secretary of Homeland Security considered another similarly situated country and determined that, for reasons similar to those present in Iraq, entry restrictions and limitations would not be appropriate.     In addition, the United States Government, led by the Department of State, continued or increased engagements with many countries about those countries' deficiencies.  A number of foreign governments sent senior officials to Washington, D.C., to discuss those issues, explore potential solutions, and convey views about obstacles to improving performance.  As a result of this engagement, one country made sufficient improvements in its information-sharing and identity-management practices and was removed from consideration for travel restrictions.     On September 13, 2019, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, after consulting with the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Director of National Intelligence, and the heads of other appropriate agencies, submitted a fourth report to me recommending the suspension of, or limitation on, the entry of certain classes of nationals from certain countries in order to protect United States national security, including by incentivizing those foreign governments to improve their practices.  The Acting Secretary of Homeland Security recommended maintaining the current restrictions on the seven countries announced in Proclamation 9645 (apart from Chad), as well as implementing suspensions and limitations on entry for certain nationals of twelve additional countries.     Since the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security issued his report on September 13, 2019, the Secretary of State, consistent with section 4(b) of Proclamation 9645, has continued to engage many foreign governments regarding the deficiencies identified in DHS's report and has continued to consult with the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Defense, and other Cabinet-level officials about how best to protect the national interest.  Based on these engagements, in January 2020, those senior officials recommended that I maintain the entry restrictions adopted in Proclamation 9645 (as modified by Proclamation 9723), and that I exercise my authority under section 212(f) of the INA to suspend entry into the United States for nationals of six new countries -- Burma (Myanmar), Eritrea, Kyrgyzstan, Nigeria, Sudan, and Tanzania -- until those countries address their identified deficiencies.     The January 2020 proposal recommended visa restrictions on fewer countries than identified by the September 2019 DHS report.  For example, the January 2020 proposal recommended no entry restrictions on nationals of one country that had been recommended for restrictions in the September 2019 report.  This country made exceptional progress in correcting deficiencies since the September 2019 report, such that it could no longer be characterized as a country that is among those posing the highest degree of risk.  In addition, the January 2020 proposal recommended that, for five poorly performing countries, foreign policy interests warranted a different approach than recommended in the September 2019 report.  Specifically, the January 2020 proposal suggested that diplomatic engagement and requests for specific improvements during a defined 180-day period would be more appropriate and more likely to result in immediate improvements in these five countries.  Each of these five countries provides critical counterterrorism cooperation with the United States and therefore holds strategic importance in countering malign external actors.  In several of the five countries, the United States has experienced a recent deepening of diplomatic ties that generally mark increased cooperation toward achieving key regional and global United States foreign policy goals.  Importantly, all five countries have credibly communicated willingness to work directly with the United States Government to correct their outstanding deficiencies, and the United States believes progress is imminent for several countries and underway for others.  For these reasons, these countries will be given an opportunity to show specific improvements in their deficiencies within the next 180 days.     Consistent with recommendations contained in the January 2020 proposal, I have decided to leave unaltered the existing entry restrictions imposed by Proclamation 9645, as amended by Proclamation 9723, and to impose tailored entry restrictions and limitations on nationals from six additional countries.  I have decided not to impose any nonimmigrant visa restrictions for the newly identified countries, which substantially reduces the number of people affected by the proposed restrictions.  Like the seven countries that continue to face travel restrictions pursuant to Proclamation 9645, the six additional countries recommended for restrictions in the January 2020 proposal are among the worst performing in the world.  However, there are prospects for near-term improvement for these six countries.  Each has a functioning government and each maintains productive relations with the United States.  Most of the newly identified countries have expressed a willingness to work with the United States to address their deficiencies, although it may take some time to identify and implement specific solutions to resolve the deficiencies.     Consistent with the January 2020 proposal, I have prioritized restricting immigrant visa travel over nonimmigrant visa travel because of the challenges of removing an individual in the United States who was admitted with an immigrant visa if, after admission to the United States, the individual is discovered to have terrorist connections, criminal ties, or misrepresented information.  Because each of the six additional countries identified in the January 2020 proposal has deficiencies in sharing terrorist, criminal, or identity information, there is an unacceptable likelihood that information reflecting the fact that a visa applicant is a threat to national security or public safety may not be available at the time the visa or entry is approved.     For two newly identified countries that were among the highest risk countries, but performed somewhat better than others, I have decided, consistent with the January 2020 proposal, to suspend entry only of Diversity Immigrants, as described in section 203(c) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1153(c).  Such a suspension represents a less severe limit compared to a general restriction on immigrant visas, given the significantly fewer number of aliens affected.  The Acting Secretary of Homeland Security considers foreign-government-supplied information especially important for screening and vetting the Diversity Visa population in comparison to other immigrant visa applicants, and I agree with that assessment.  In many cases, the United States Government may not have the same amount of information about Diversity Visa applicants compared with other categories of immigrant visa applicants because Diversity Visa applicants, with limited exceptions, do not have the burden to show certain family ties to or employment in the United States, or particular service to the United States Government, as required for other immigrant visa categories.     Consistent with the January 2020 proposal, I have decided not to impose any restrictions on certain Special Immigrant Visas for nationals of the six newly identified countries.  Applicants under Special Immigrant programs generally do not need to demonstrate the same work or familial ties as other immigrant visas, but do need to show other unique qualifications.  This exception is intended to cover those Special Immigrants who have advanced United States interests (and their eligible family members), such as foreign nationals who have worked for a United States Embassy for 15 years or more and are especially deserving of a visa.     As President, I must continue to act to protect the security and interests of the United States and its people.  I remain committed to our ongoing efforts to engage those countries willing to cooperate, to improve information-sharing and identity-management protocols and procedures, and to address both terrorism-related and public-safety risks.  And I believe that the assessment process, including enhancements made to that process, leads to new partnerships that strengthen our immigration screening and vetting capabilities.  Until the countries identified in this proclamation satisfactorily address the identified deficiencies, I have determined, on the basis of a recommendation from the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security and other members of my Cabinet, to impose certain conditional restrictions and limitations on entry into the United States of nationals of the countries identified in section 1 of this proclamation, as set forth more fully below.     NOW, THEREFORE, I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, by the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including sections 212(f) and 215(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(f) and 1185(a), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, hereby find that, absent the measures set forth in this proclamation, the immigrant entry into the United States of persons described in section 1 of this proclamation would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, and that their entry should be subject to certain restrictions, limitations, and exceptions.  I therefore hereby proclaim the following:       Section 1.  Suspension of Entry for Nationals of Countries of Identified Concern.   The entry into the United States of nationals of the following countries is hereby suspended and limited, as follows, subject to section 2 of this proclamation.     (a)  The entry suspensions and limitations enacted by section 2 of Proclamation 9645 are not altered by this proclamation, and they remain in force by their terms, except as modified by Proclamation 9723.     (b)  Burma (Myanmar)             (i)  Although Burma has begun to engage with the United States on a variety of identity-management and information-sharing issues, it does not comply with the established identity-management and information-sharing criteria assessed by the performance metrics.  Burma does not issue electronic passports nor does it adequately share several types of information, including public-safety and terrorism-related information, that are necessary for the protection of the national security and public safety of the United States.  Burma is in the process of modernizing its domestic identity-management and criminal-records systems and has worked with the United States to develop some of those systems.  It has also recognized the need to make improvements.  As its capabilities improve, the prospect for further bilateral cooperation will likely also increase.  Despite these encouraging prospects, Burma's identified deficiencies create vulnerabilities that terrorists, criminals, and fraudulent entrants could exploit to harm United States national security and public safety.             (ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of Burma as immigrants, except as Special Immigrants whose eligibility is based on having provided assistance to the United States Government, is hereby suspended.     (c)  Eritrea             (i)  Eritrea does not comply with the established identity-management and information-sharing criteria assessed by the performance metrics.  Eritrea does not issue electronic passports or adequately share several types of information, including public-safety and terrorism-related information, that are necessary for the protection of the national security and public safety of the United States.  Further, Eritrea is currently subject to several nonimmigrant visa restrictions.  Eritrea does not accept return of its nationals subject to final orders of removal from the United States, which further magnifies the challenges of removing its nationals who have entered with immigrant visas.  Eritrea has engaged with the United States about its deficiencies, but it also requires significant reforms to its border security, travel-document security, and information-sharing infrastructure.  Improvements in these areas will increase its opportunities to come into compliance with the United States Government's identity-management and information-sharing criteria.             (ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of Eritrea as immigrants, except as Special Immigrants whose eligibility is based on having provided assistance to the United States Government, is hereby suspended.     (d)  Kyrgyzstan             (i)  Kyrgyzstan does not comply with the established identity-management and information-sharing criteria assessed by the performance metrics.  Kyrgyzstan does not issue electronic passports or adequately share several types of information, including public-safety and terrorism-related information, that are necessary for the protection of the national security and public safety of the United States.  Kyrgyzstan also presents an elevated risk, relative to other countries in the world, of terrorist travel to the United States, though it has been responsive to United States diplomatic engagement on the need to make improvements.             (ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of Kyrgyzstan as immigrants, except as Special Immigrants whose eligibility is based on having provided assistance to the United States Government, is hereby suspended.     (e)  Nigeria             (i)  Nigeria does not comply with the established identity-management and information-sharing criteria assessed by the performance metrics.  Nigeria does not adequately share public-safety and terrorism-related information, which is necessary for the protection of the national security and public safety of the United States.  Nigeria also presents a high risk, relative to other countries in the world, of terrorist travel to the United States.  Nigeria is an important strategic partner in the global fight against terrorism, and the United States continues to engage with Nigeria on these and other issues.  The Department of State has provided significant assistance to Nigeria as it modernizes its border management capabilities, and the Government of Nigeria recognizes the importance of improving its information sharing with the United States.  Nevertheless, these investments have not yet resulted in sufficient improvements in Nigeria's information sharing with the United States for border and immigration screening and vetting.             (ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of Nigeria as immigrants, except as Special Immigrants whose eligibility is based on having provided assistance to the United States Government, is hereby suspended.     (f)  Sudan             (i)  Sudan generally does not comply with our identity-management performance metrics and presents a high risk, relative to other countries in the world, of terrorist travel to the United States.  Sudan is, however, transitioning to civilian rule, a process which should improve opportunities for cooperation in the future, and it has already made progress in addressing its deficiencies in several areas.  For example, Sudan now issues electronic passports and has improved its coordination with INTERPOL in several respects.  Sudan has also shared exemplars of its passports with the United States and now permanently invalidates lost and stolen passports and fraudulently obtained travel documents.  Because Sudan performed somewhat better than the countries listed earlier in this proclamation and is making important reforms to its system of government, different travel restrictions are warranted.             (ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of Sudan as Diversity Immigrants, as described in section 203(c) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1153(c), is hereby suspended.     (g)  Tanzania             (i)  Tanzania does not comply with the established identity-management and information-sharing criteria assessed by the performance metrics.  Tanzania does not adequately share several types of information, including public-safety and terrorism-related information, that is necessary for the protection of the national security and public safety of the United States.  The Government of Tanzania's significant failures to adequately share information with the United States and other countries about possible Ebola cases in its territory detract from my confidence in its ability to resolve these deficiencies.  Tanzania also presents an elevated risk, relative to other countries in the world, of terrorist travel to the United States.  Tanzania does, however, issue electronic passports for all major passport classes, reports lost and stolen travel documents to INTERPOL at least once a month, and has provided exemplars of its current passports to the United States.  Further, Tanzania does share some information with the United States, although its processes can be slow, overly bureaucratic, and complicated by limited technical capability.  In light of these considerations, different travel restrictions are warranted.             (ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of Tanzania as Diversity Immigrants, as described in section 203(c) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1153(c), is hereby suspended.     Sec. 2.  Scope and Implementation of Suspensions and Limitations.   (a)  Subject to the exceptions set forth in section 3(b) of Proclamation 9645, any waiver under section 3(c) of Proclamation 9645, and any enforcement provision of section 6(b) through (e) of Proclamation 9645, the suspensions of and limitations on entry pursuant to section 1(b) of this proclamation shall apply to foreign nationals of the designated countries who:         (i)    are outside the United States on the applicable effective date of this proclamation;         (ii)   do not have a valid visa on the applicable effective date of this proclamation; and         (iii)  do not qualify for a visa or other valid travel document under section 6(d) of Proclamation 9645.     (b)  The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall coordinate to update guidance, if necessary, to implement this proclamation as to nationals of the six countries identified in section 1(b) of this proclamation, consistent with the provisions of this section.     (c)  For purposes of this proclamation, the phrase "Special Immigrants whose eligibility is based on having provided assistance to the United States Government" means those aliens described in section 101(a)(27)(D) through (G) and (K) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(D) through (G) and (K), any alien seeking to enter the United States pursuant to a Special Immigrant Visa in the SI or SQ classification, and any spouse and children of any such individual.     Sec. 3.  Reporting Requirements.    (a)  Section 4 of Proclamation 9645 is amended to read as follows:          "Sec. 4.  Adjustments to Removal of Suspensions and Limitations.         "(a)  The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall on October 1, 2020, and annually thereafter, submit to the President the results of an evaluation as to whether to continue, terminate, modify, or supplement any suspensions of, or limitations on, the entry on certain classes of nationals of countries identified in section 2 of this proclamation and section 1(b) of the Proclamation "Improving Enhanced Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats," signed on January 31, 2020.         "(b)  The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, shall not less than every 2 years evaluate whether each country in the world sufficiently shares relevant information and maintains adequate identity-management and information-sharing practices to mitigate the risk that its citizens or residents may travel to the United States in furtherance of criminal or terrorist objectives, or otherwise seek to violate any law of the United States through travel or immigration.  In doing so, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall:         "(i)   in consultation with the Secretary of State, Attorney General, and the Director of National Intelligence, report to the President, through the appropriate Assistants to the President, any instance in which, based on a review conducted under subsection (b) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security believes it is in the interests of the United States to suspend or limit the entry of certain classes of nationals of a country; and         "(ii)  in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, regularly review and update as necessary the criteria and methodology by which such evaluations are implemented to ensure they continue to protect the national interests of the United States.         "(c)  Notwithstanding the requirements set forth in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, Attorney General, and the Director of National Intelligence, may, at any time, recommend that the President impose, modify, or terminate a suspension or limitation on entry on certain classes of foreign nationals to protect the national interests of the United States."     (b)  Section 5 of Proclamation 9645 is revoked.     Sec. 4.  Effective Date.   This proclamation is effective at 12:01 am eastern standard time on February 21, 2020.  With respect to the application of those provisions of Proclamation 9645 that are incorporated here through section 2 for countries designated in section 1(b), and that contained their own effective dates, those dates are correspondingly updated to be January 31, 2020, or February 21, 2020, as appropriate.     Sec. 5.  Severability.    It is the policy of the United States to enforce this proclamation to the maximum extent possible to advance the national security, foreign policy, and counterterrorism interests of the United States.  Accordingly:     (a)  if any provision of this proclamation, or the application of any provision to any person or circumstance, is held to be invalid, the remainder of this proclamation and the application of its other provisions to any other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby; and     (b)  if any provision of this proclamation, or the application of any provision to any person or circumstance, is held to be invalid because of the lack of certain procedural requirements, the relevant executive branch officials shall implement those procedural requirements to conform with existing law and with any applicable court orders.     Sec. 6.  General Provisions.   (a)  Nothing in this proclamation shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:         (i)    United States Government obligations under applicable international agreements;         (ii)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or         (iii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.     (b)  This proclamation shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.     (c)  This proclamation is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this thirty-first day of January, in the year of our Lord two thousand twenty, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and forty-fourth.                                DONALD J. TRUMP                    ###