Message to the Congress on the Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Serious Human Rights Abuse and Corruption

 

Office of the Press Secretary FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE December 16, 2020

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:         Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)) provides for the automatic termination of a national emergency unless, within 90 days before the anniversary date of its declaration, the President publishes in the Federal Register and transmits to the Congress a notice stating that the emergency is to continue in effect beyond the anniversary date.  In accordance with this provision, I have sent to the Federal Register for publication the enclosed notice stating that the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13818 of December 20, 2017, is to continue in effect beyond December 20, 2020.      The prevalence and severity of human rights abuse and corruption that have their source, in whole or in substantial part, outside the United States, continue to threaten the stability of international political and economic systems.  Human rights abuse and corruption undermine the values that form an essential foundation of stable, secure, and functioning societies; have devastating impacts on individuals; weaken democratic institutions; degrade the rule of law; perpetuate violent conflicts; facilitate the activities of dangerous persons; undermine economic markets; and continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.  Therefore, I have determined that it is necessary to continue the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13818 with respect to serious human rights abuse and corruption.                                   DONALD J. TRUMP   THE WHITE HOUSE,     December 16, 2020.

Text of a Notice on the Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Serious Human Rights Abuse and Corruption

 

Office of the Press Secretary FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE December 16, 2020 NOTICE   - - - - - - -   CONTINUATION OF THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE AND CORRUPTION         On December 20, 2017, by Executive Order 13818, the President declared a national emergency with respect to serious human rights abuse and corruption around the world and, pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), took related steps to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.       The prevalence and severity of human rights abuse and corruption that have their source, in whole or in substantial part, outside the United States, continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.  For this reason, the national emergency declared on December 20, 2017, must continue in effect beyond December 20, 2020.  Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13818 with respect to serious human rights abuse and corruption.       This notice shall be published in the Federal Register and transmitted to the Congress.                                      DONALD J. TRUMP       THE WHITE HOUSE,     December 16, 2020.

President Donald J. Trump Announces Intent to Appoint Individuals to Key Administration Posts

 

Office of the Press Secretary FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE December 16, 2020 President Donald J. Trump Announces Intent to Appoint Individuals to Key Administration Posts   Today, President Donald J. Trump announced his intent to appoint the following individuals to key positions in his Administration:   Andrew H. Giuliani, of New York, to be a Member of the United States Holocaust Memorial Council.   Nicholas F. Luna, of Tennessee, to be a Member of the United States Holocaust Memorial Council.   Mitch Webber, of Maryland, to be a Member of the United States Holocaust Memorial Council.   Julie T. Radford, of Louisiana, to be a Member of the Community Development Advisory Board.   Professor Adam Candeub, of Michigan, to be a Member of the Board of Directors of the National Board for Education Sciences.   James O’Neill, of California, to be a Member of the Board of Directors of the National Board for Education Sciences.   Kristan King Nevins, of Texas, to be a Member of the Board of Directors of the National Board for Education Sciences.   Gibson Worsham, of Virginia, to be a Member of the National Capital Planning Commission.   Anna Cristina “Rickie” Niceta, of Maryland, to be a Member of the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation.   Suzanna Sexton, of Connecticut, to be a Member of the President’s Committee for People with Intellectual Disabilities.   Jeannie Leauma, of California, to be a Member of the President’s Committee for People with Intellectual Disabilities.   Teri Geston, of California, to be a Member of the President’s Committee for People with Intellectual Disabilities.   Munr Kazmir, of New Jersey, to be a Member of the National Council on Disability.   David D’Arcangelo, of Massachusetts, to be a Member of the National Council on Disability.

Memorandum on the National Strategy for Space Nuclear Power and Propulsion (Space Policy Directive-6)

 

Office of the Press Secretary FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE December 16, 2020 December 16, 2020       Space Policy Directive-6   MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT                THE SECRETARY OF STATE                THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE                THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE                THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION                THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY                THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT                   AND BUDGET                THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL                   SECURITY AFFAIRS                THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS                   AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION                THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION                THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND                   TECHNOLOGY POLICY   SUBJECT:       National Strategy for Space Nuclear Power                and Propulsion             Section 1.  Policy.  The ability to use space nuclear power and propulsion (SNPP) systems safely, securely, and sustainably is vital to maintaining and advancing United States dominance and strategic leadership in space.  SNPP systems include radioisotope power systems (RPSs) and fission reactors used for power or propulsion in spacecraft, rovers, and other surface elements.  SNPP systems can allow operation of such elements in environments in which solar and chemical power are inadequate.  They can produce more power at lower mass and volume compared to other energy sources, thereby enabling persistent presence and operations.  SNPP systems also can shorten transit times for crewed and robotic spacecraft, thereby reducing radiation exposure in harsh space environments.          National Security Presidential Memorandum-20 (NSPM-20) of August 20, 2019 (Launch of Spacecraft Containing Space Nuclear Systems), updated the process for launches of spacecraft containing space nuclear systems.  It established it as the policy of the United States to "develop and use space nuclear systems when such systems safely enable or enhance space exploration or operational capabilities."         Cooperation with commercial and international partners is critical to achieving America's objectives for space exploration.  Presidential Policy Directive 4 of June 28, 2010 (National Space Policy), as amended by the Presidential Memorandum of December 11, 2017 (Reinvigorating America's Human Space Exploration Program), established it as the policy of the United States to "[l]ead an innovative and sustainable program of exploration with commercial and international partners to enable human expansion across the solar system and to bring back to Earth new knowledge and opportunities."        This memorandum establishes a national strategy to ensure the development and use of SNPP systems when appropriate to enable and achieve the scientific, exploration, national security, and commercial objectives of the United States.  In the context of this strategy only, the term "development" includes the full development process from design through testing and production, and the term "use" includes launch, operation, and disposition.  This memorandum outlines high-level policy goals and a supporting roadmap that will advance the ability of the United States to use SNPP systems safely, securely, and sustainably.  The execution of this strategy will be subject to relevant budgetary and regulatory processes and to the availability of appropriations.        Sec. 2.  Goals.  The United States will pursue goals for SNPP development and use that are both mission-enabling and ambitious in their substance and their timeline.  These goals will enable a range of existing and future space missions, with the aim of accelerating achievement of key milestones, including in-space demonstration and use of new SNPP capabilities.  This memorandum establishes the following such goals for the Nation:        (a)  Develop uranium fuel processing capabilities that enable production of fuel that is suitable to lunar and planetary surface and in-space power, nuclear electric propulsion (NEP), and nuclear thermal propulsion (NTP) applications, as needed.  These capabilities should support the ability to produce different uranium fuel forms to meet the nearest-term mission needs and, to the extent feasible, should maximize commonality -- meaning use of the same or similar materials, processes, designs, or infrastructure -- across these fuel forms.  To maximize private-sector engagement and cost savings, these capabilities should be developed to enable a range of terrestrial as well as space applications, including future commercial applications;        (b)  Demonstrate a fission power system on the surface of the Moon that is scalable to a power range of 40 kilowatt-electric (kWe) and higher to support a sustained lunar presence and exploration of Mars.  To the extent feasible, this power system should align with mission needs for, and potential future government and commercial applications of, in-space power, NEP, and terrestrial nuclear power;        (c)  Establish the technical foundations and capabilities -- including through identification and resolution of the key technical challenges -- that will enable options for NTP to meet future Department of Defense (DoD) and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) mission requirements; and        (d)  Develop advanced RPS capabilities that provide higher fuel efficiency, higher specific energy, and longer operational lifetime than existing RPS capabilities, thus enabling survivable surface elements to support robotic and human exploration of the Moon and Mars and extending robotic exploration of the solar system.        Sec. 3.  Principles.  The United States will adhere to principles of safety, security, and sustainability in its development and use of SNPP systems, in accordance with all applicable Federal laws and consistent with international obligations and commitments.        (a)  Safety.  All executive departments and agencies (agencies) involved in the development and use of SNPP systems shall take appropriate measures to ensure, within their respective roles and responsibilities, the safe development, testing, launch, operation, and disposition of SNPP systems.  For United States Government SNPP programs, the sponsoring agency holds primary responsibility for safety.  For programs involving multiple agencies, the terms of cooperation shall designate a lead agency with primary responsibility for safety in each stage of development and use.             (i)    Ground development.  Activities associated with ground development, including ground testing, of SNPP systems shall be conducted in accordance with applicable Federal, State, and local laws and existing authorities of regulatory agencies.           (ii)   Launch.  NSPM-20 established safety guidelines and safety analysis and review processes for Federal Government launches of spacecraft containing space nuclear systems, including SNPP systems, and for launches for which the Department of Transportation has statutory authority to license as commercial space launch activities (commercial launches).  These guidelines and processes address launch and any subsequent stages during which accidents may result in radiological effects on the public or the environment -- for instance, in an unplanned reentry from Earth orbit or during an Earth flyby.  Launch activities shall be conducted in accordance with these guidelines and processes.           (iii)  Operation and disposition.  The operation and disposition of SNPP systems shall be planned and conducted in a manner that protect human and environmental safety and national security assets.  Fission reactor SNPP systems may be operated on interplanetary missions, in sufficiently high orbits, and in low-Earth orbits if they are stored in sufficiently high orbits after the operational part of their mission.  In this context, a sufficiently high orbit is one in which the orbital lifetime of the spacecraft is long enough for the fission products to decay to a level of radioactivity comparable to that of uranium-235 by the time it reenters the Earth's atmosphere, and the risks to existing and future space missions and of collision with objects in space are minimized.  Spacecraft operating fission reactors in low-Earth orbits shall incorporate a highly reliable operational system to ensure effective and controlled disposition of the reactor.        (b)  Security.  All agencies involved in the development and use of SNPP systems shall take appropriate measures to protect nuclear and radiological materials and sensitive information, consistent with sound nuclear nonproliferation principles.  For United States Government SNPP programs, the sponsoring agency holds primary responsibility for security.  For programs involving multiple agencies, the terms of cooperation shall designate a lead agency with primary responsibility for security in each stage of development and use.  The use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in SNPP systems should be limited to applications for which the mission would not be viable with other nuclear fuels or non‑nuclear power sources.  Before selecting HEU or, for fission reactor systems, any nuclear fuel other than low‑enriched uranium (LEU), for any given SNPP design or mission, the sponsoring agency shall conduct a thorough technical review to assess the viability of alternative nuclear fuels.  The sponsoring agency shall provide to the respective staffs of the National Security Council, the National Space Council, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and the Office of Management and Budget a briefing that provides justification for why the use of HEU or other non-LEU fuel is required, and any steps the agency has taken to address nuclear safety, security, and proliferation-related risks.  The Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy shall ensure, through the National Science and Technology Council, that other relevant agencies are invited to participate in these briefings.        (c)  Sustainability.  All agencies involved in the development and use of SNPP systems shall take appropriate measures to conduct these activities in a manner that is suitable for the long-term sustainment of United States space capabilities and leadership in SNPP.             (i) Coordination and Collaboration. To maximize efficiency and return on taxpayer investment, the heads of relevant agencies shall seek and pursue opportunities to coordinate among existing and future SNPP development and use programs.Connecting current efforts with likely future applications will help ensure that such programs can contribute to long-term United States SNPP capabilities and leadership.Agencies also shall seek opportunities to partner with the private sector, including academic institutions, in order to facilitate contributions to United States SNPP capabilities and leadership.To help identify opportunities for collaboration, the heads of relevant agencies should conduct regular technical exchanges among SNPP programs, to the extent that such exchanges are consistent with the principle of security and comply with applicable Federal, State, and local laws.Agencies shall coordinate with the Department of State when seeking opportunities for international partnerships.             (ii)   Commonality.  The heads of relevant agencies shall seek to identify and use opportunities for commonality among SNPP systems, and between SNPP and terrestrial nuclear systems, whenever doing so could advance program and policy objectives without unduly inhibiting innovation or market development, or hampering system suitability to specific mission applications.  For example, opportunities for commonality may exist in goals (e.g., demonstration timeline), reactor design, nuclear fuels (e.g., fuel type and form, and enrichment level), supplementary systems (e.g., power conversion, moderator, reflector, shielding, and system vessel), methods (e.g., additive manufacturing of fuel or reactor elements), and infrastructure (e.g., fuel supply, testing facilities, launch facilities, and workforce).           (iii)  Cost-effectiveness.  The heads of relevant agencies should pursue SNPP development and use solutions that are cost-effective while also consistent with the principles of safety and security.  For any program or system, the heads of such agencies should seek to identify the combination of in-space and ground-based testing and certification that will best qualify the system for a given mission while ensuring public safety.        Sec. 4.  Roles and Responsibilities.  (a)  The Vice President, on behalf of the President and acting through the National Space Council, shall coordinate United States policy related to use of SNPP systems.        (b)  The Secretary of State shall, under the direction of the President, coordinate United States activities related to international obligations and commitments and international cooperation involving SNPP.        (c)  The Secretary of Defense shall conduct and support activities associated with development and use of SNPP systems to enable and achieve United States national security objectives.  When appropriate, the Secretary of Defense shall facilitate private-sector engagement in DoD SNPP activities.        (d)  The Secretary of Commerce shall promote responsible United States commercial SNPP investment, innovation, and use, and shall, when consistent with the authorities of the Secretary, ensure the publication of clear, flexible, performance-based rules that are applicable to use of SNPP and are easily navigated.  Under the direction of the Secretary of Commerce, the Department of Commerce (DOC) shall ascertain and communicate the views of private-sector partners and potential private-sector partners to relevant agency partners in order to facilitate public-private collaboration in SNPP development and use.         (e)  The Secretary of Transportation's statutory authority includes licensing commercial launches and reentries, including vehicles containing SNPP systems.  Within this capacity, the Secretary of Transportation shall, when appropriate, facilitate private-sector engagement in the launch or reentry aspect of SNPP development and use activities, in support of United States science, exploration, national security, and commercial objectives.  To help ensure the launch safety of an SNPP payload, and consistent with 51 U.S.C. 50904, a payload review may be conducted as part of a license application review or may be requested by a payload owner or operator in advance of or apart from a license application.        (f)  The Secretary of Energy shall, in coordination with sponsoring agencies and other agencies, as appropriate, support development and use of SNPP systems to enable and achieve United States scientific, exploration, and national security objectives.  When appropriate, the Secretary of Energy shall work with sponsoring agencies and DOC to facilitate United States private-sector engagement in Department of Energy (DOE) SNPP activities.  Under the direction of the Secretary of Energy and consistent with the authorities granted to DOE, including authorities under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2011, et seq., DOE may authorize ground-based SNPP development activities, including DOE activities conducted in coordination with sponsoring agencies and private-sector entities.  As directed in NSPM-20, the Secretary of Energy shall maintain, on a full-cost recovery basis, the capability and infrastructure to develop, furnish, and conduct safety analyses for space nuclear systems for use in United States Government space systems.         (g)  The Administrator of NASA shall conduct and support activities associated with development and use of SNPP systems to enable and achieve United States space science and exploration objectives.  The Administrator of NASA shall establish the performance requirements for SNPP capabilities necessary to achieve those objectives.  When appropriate, the Administrator of NASA shall facilitate private-sector engagement in NASA SNPP activities, and shall coordinate with the Secretary of Commerce and, as appropriate, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Energy, to help facilitate private-sector SNPP activities.         (h)  The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has statutory authority under the AEA for licensing and regulatory safety and security oversight of commercial nuclear activities taking place within the United States.  The NRC should, as appropriate and particularly in circumstances within NRC authority where DOE regulatory authorities cannot be applied, enable private-sector engagement in SNPP development and use activities in support of United States science, exploration, national security, and commercial objectives.        (i)  The Director of the Office and Science and Technology Policy shall coordinate United States policy related to research and development of SNPP systems.        Sec. 5.  Roadmap.  The United States will pursue a coordinated roadmap for federally-supported SNPP activities to achieve the goals and uphold the principles established in this memorandum.  This roadmap comprises the following elements, which the relevant agencies should pursue consistent with the following objective timeline, subject to relevant budgetary and regulatory processes and to the availability of appropriations:         (a)  By the mid-2020s, develop uranium fuel processing capabilities that enable production of fuel that is suitable for lunar and planetary surface and in-space power, NEP, and NTP applications, as needed.             (i)    Identify relevant mission needs.  DoD and NASA should provide to DOE any mission needs (e.g., power density, environment, and timelines) relevant to the identification of fuels suitable for planetary surface and in-space power, NEP, and NTP applications.             (ii)   Identify candidate fuel or fuels.  DoD and NASA, in cooperation with DOE and private-sector partners, as appropriate, should identify candidate fuel or fuels to meet the identified mission requirements.  This review and assessment should account for current and expected United States capabilities to produce and qualify for use candidate fuels, and for potential commonality of fuels or fuel variants across multiple planetary surface and in-space power, in-space propulsion, and terrestrial applications.             (iii)  Qualify at least one candidate fuel.  DoD and NASA, in cooperation with DOE and private-sector partners, as appropriate, should qualify a fuel or fuels for demonstrations of a planetary surface power reactor and an in-space propulsion system.  While seeking opportunities to use private-sector-partner capabilities, agencies should ensure that the Federal Government retains an ability for screening and qualification of candidate fuels.             (iv)   Supply fuel for demonstrations.  DOE, in cooperation with NASA and DoD, and with private-sector partners, as appropriate, should identify feedstock and uranium that can be made available for planetary surface power and in-space propulsion demonstrations.  DOE shall ensure that any provision of nuclear material for SNPP will not disrupt enriched uranium supplies for the United States nuclear weapons program and the naval propulsion program, and that SNPP needs are included among broader considerations of nuclear fuel supply provisioning and management.        (b)  By the mid- to late-2020s, demonstrate a fission power system on the surface of the Moon that is scalable to a power range of 40 kWe and higher to support sustained lunar presence and exploration of Mars.             (i)    Initiate a surface power project.  NASA should initiate a fission surface power project for lunar surface demonstration by 2027, with scalability to Mars exploration.  NASA should consult with DoD and other agencies, and with the private sector, as appropriate, when developing project requirements.             (ii)   Conduct technology and requirements assessment.  NASA, in coordination with DoD and other agencies, and with private-sector partners, as appropriate, should evaluate technology options for a surface power system including reactor designs, power conversion, shielding, and thermal management.  NASA should work with other agencies, and private-sector partners, as appropriate, to evaluate opportunities for commonality among other SNPP needs, including in-space power and terrestrial power needs, possible NEP technology needs, and reactor demonstrations planned by NASA, other agencies, or the private sector.             (iii)  Engage the private sector.  DOE and NASA should determine a mechanism or mechanisms for engaging with the private sector to meet NASA's SNPP surface power needs in an effective manner consistent with the guiding principles set forth in this memorandum.  In evaluating mechanisms, DOE and NASA should consider the possibility of NASA issuing a request for proposal for the development and construction of the surface power reactor system or demonstration.             (iv)   System development.  NASA should work with DOE, and with other agencies and private-sector partners, as appropriate, to develop the lunar surface power demonstration project.             (v)    Conduct demonstration mission.  NASA, in coordination with other agencies and with private-sector partners, as appropriate, should launch and conduct the lunar surface power demonstration project.        (c)  By the late-2020s, establish the technical foundations and capabilities -- including through identification and resolution of the key technical challenges -- that will enable NTP options to meet future DoD and NASA mission needs.             (i)   Conduct requirements assessment.  DoD and NASA, in cooperation with DOE, and with other agencies and private-sector partners, as appropriate, should assess the ability of NTP capabilities to enable and advance existing and potential future DoD and NASA mission requirements.             (ii)   Conduct technology assessment.  DoD and NASA, in cooperation with DOE, and with other agencies and private-sector partners, as appropriate, should evaluate technology options and associated key technical challenges for an NTP system, including reactor designs, power conversion, and thermal management.  DoD and NASA should work with their partners to evaluate and use opportunities for commonality with other SNPP needs, terrestrial power needs, and reactor demonstration projects planned by agencies and the private sector.             (iii)  Technology development.  DoD, in coordination with DOE and other agencies, and with private-sector partners, as appropriate, should develop reactor and propulsion system technologies that will resolve the key technical challenges in areas such as reactor design and production, propulsion system and spacecraft design, and SNPP system integration.        (d)  By 2030, develop advanced RPS capabilities that provide higher fuel efficiency, higher specific energy, and longer operational lifetime than existing RPS capabilities, thus enabling survivable surface elements to support robotic and human exploration of the Moon and Mars and extending robotic exploration of the solar system.           (i)    Maintain RPS capability.  Mission sponsoring agencies should assess their needs for radioisotope heat source material to meet emerging mission requirements, and should work with DOE to jointly identify the means to produce or acquire the necessary material on a timeline that meets mission requirements.             (ii)   Engage the private sector.  NASA, in coordination with DOE and DOC, should conduct an assessment of opportunities for engaging the private sector to meet RPS needs in an effective manner consistent with the guiding principles established in this memorandum.             (iii)  Conduct technology and requirements assessment.  NASA, in coordination with DOE and DoD, and with other agencies and private-sector partners, as appropriate, should assess requirements for next-generation RPS systems and evaluate technology options for meeting those requirements.           (iv)   System development.  DOE, in coordination with NASA and DoD, and with other agencies and private-sector partners, as appropriate, should develop one or more next-generation RPS system or systems to meet the goals of higher fuel efficiency, higher specific energy, and longer operational lifetime for the required range of power.       Sec. 6.  Implementation.  The Vice President, through the National Space Council, shall coordinate implementation of this memorandum.        Sec. 7.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this memorandum shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:             (i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or             (ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.        (b)  This memorandum shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.        (c)  This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.        (d)  The Secretary of Energy is authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the Federal Register.                                          DONALD J. TRUMP

Readout from First Lady Melania Trump’s Visit to Children’s National Hospital

 

Office of the First Lady FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE December 15, 2020 Readout from First Lady Melania Trump’s Visit to Children’s National Hospital   Today, First Lady Melania Trump made her fourth annual holiday visit to Children’s National Hospital in Washington, D.C. Mrs. Trump continued this First Lady holiday tradition of visiting with young patients and their families who are unable to spend the holidays in the comfort of their homes. The tradition dates back more than 70 years.   During this year's visit, the First Lady read “Oliver the Ornament Meets Marley & Joan and Abbey,” by author Todd Zimmerman, to a small group of socially-distanced patients and their families in the hospital’s atrium. The reading was broadcast to the hospital’s 325 inpatient rooms so that children and their families could watch the reading from the safety of their rooms.   Mrs. Trump also visited Seacrest Studios, where she led a holiday-themed round of bingo with the children. Bingo is one of the most popular activities at Children’s National and it has become a way to spread cheer to the children in an environment that seems less serious and more fun, and helps to encourage the young patients through challenging parts of their day. Mrs. Trump kicked off the game by reading the cards until patients announced “Bingo.” The First Lady interacted with the patients via phone and confirmed that each was the winner and congratulated them. The game was live-streamed to the patient rooms allowing children throughout the hospital to safely play along.   Following her visit, The First Lady stated: “This is my fourth year visiting Children’s National Hospital during the holiday season and I was excited to be invited back this year to continue this time-honored tradition. This is one of my favorite events of the season and it was a joy to spend the afternoon reading a holiday inspired story and safely interact with the patients, doctors, nurses and other healthcare professionals. I am grateful to have had the opportunity to find a safe way to spread a little Christmas cheer to all of the courageous and brave children at Children’s National. They are all heroes who truly radiate the spirit and meaning of the season.” Due to the ongoing coronavirus pandemic, the event was limited in numbers of in-person participants and all guests were required to wear face masks and adhere to social distancing. The visit followed the hospital’s mask protocols for public speakers, based on the District of Columbia health guidance, that wearing a mask is not required when a person is giving a speech for broadcast or an audience, provided no one is within six feet of the speaker. Throughout the holiday program, the First Lady was more than twelve feet away from others in the four-story atrium. Today’s visit, broadcast to 325 inpatient hospital rooms, followed these guidelines.

President Donald J. Trump Announces Intent to Nominate and Appoint Individuals to Key Administration Posts

 

Office of the Press Secretary FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE December 14, 2020 President Donald J. Trump Announces Intent to Nominate and Appoint Individuals to Key Administration Posts Today, President Donald J. Trump announced his intent to nominate the following individual to a key position in his Administration: Roy A. Bernardi, of New York, to be a Governor of the United States Postal Service. Roy A. Bernardi is currently a managing partner of The Bernardi Group, LLC, where he offers expertise, counsel and advice to various companies and organizations. Mr. Bernardi was most recently a Senior Advisor for CohnReznick, LLP, from 2013 to 2016 and Vice President of Government Relations for CGI Technologies and Solutions Inc. from 2009 through 2011. Earlier in his career, Mr. Bernardi served as Deputy Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in the administration of President George W. Bush. As Deputy Secretary, he managed HUD’s day-to-day operations, and oversaw the agency’s 8,500 employees and $38 billion annual budget. Prior to his service as Deputy Secretary, Mr. Bernardi was Assistant Secretary of Community Planning and Development at HUD. There, he helped develop viable communities by promoting integrated solutions to the challenges facing the Nation’s cities, as well as urban and rural communities. Before joining the Bush administration, Mr. Bernardi was the 51st Mayor of the City of Syracuse, New York. As Mayor, he overhauled municipal financial services, eliminated duplicative departmental functions, and streamlined governmental operations, resulting in significant annual budget savings. He also served as President of the New York State Conference of Mayors. Mr. Bernardi earned his Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of the Americas and his Master’s degree from Syracuse University.   --- Today, President Donald J. Trump announced his intent to appoint the following individuals to key positions in his Administration: Siri Terjesen, of Florida, to be a Member of the Board of Directors of the National Board for Education Sciences.   Max Miller, of Ohio, to be a Member of the United States Holocaust Memorial Council.   Michael S. Glassner, of New Jersey, to be a Member of the United States Holocaust Memorial Council.   Adam Telle, of Alabama, to be a Member of the Public Interest Declassification Board.   Paul-Noel Chretien, of Virginia, to be a Member of the Public Interest Declassification Board.   Paul E. Dans, of Maryland, to be a Member and Chairman of the National Capital Planning Commission.   Anthony J. Tata, of Virginia, to be a Member of the Board of Visitors to the United States Merchant Marine Academy.   Bryan Lanza, of Virginia, to be a Member of the President’s Advisory Commission on Hispanic Prosperity.   Rev. Eve Nunez, of Arizona, to be a Member of the President’s Advisory Commission on Hispanic Prosperity.   Antonio L. Medina Comas, of Puerto Rico, to be a Member of the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico.

 

The White House • December 14, 2020

BREAKING: America’s first Coronavirus vaccine doses are administered!  Today, medical workers administered the first COVID-19 vaccine doses in the United States–a feat that earlier this year many experts claimed would take a miracle.   “This spring, experts predicted that a vaccine was at least a year or year-and-a-half away,” Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar said. “Yet, within a year, we have one vaccine authorized—millions of doses being shipped—and another vaccine under review by the FDA.”   Accomplishing the “impossible” has defined President Trump’s Administration. When the Coronavirus came to our shores, the President cut Washington red tape and mobilized both the public and private sectors to develop a safe, effective vaccine. The nationwide manufacturing and distribution systems created under Operation Warp Speed constitute the largest mobilization of American industry since World War II.   As President Trump says, this pandemic started in China—but America will end it.    WATCH: We can see light at the end of the tunnel   On top of clearing unnecessary barriers to get a vaccine to the American people in record time, President Trump just signed an executive order to ensure that U.S. citizens are the first in line for it. President Trump always puts our country first. The delivery of the Coronavirus vaccine is no different.   None of this success would be possible without both our courageous frontline medical workers and our incredible United States military. Today is a momentous victory for all Americans—and the rest of the world—in defeating this terrible virus.      Secretary Azar: The end of this pandemic is in sight    Dr. Slaoui: Within 3 months, we expect 100 million vaccine doses

Executive Order on Increasing Economic and Geographic Mobility

 

Office of the Press Secretary FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE December 14, 2020 EXECUTIVE ORDER   - - - - - - -   INCREASING ECONOMIC AND GEOGRAPHIC MOBILITY          By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including section 305 of title 5, United States Code, and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, it is hereby ordered as follows:      Section 1.  Policy and Principles.  As expressed in Executive Order 13777 of February 24, 2017 (Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda), it is the policy of the United States to alleviate unnecessary regulatory burdens placed on the American people.  Overly burdensome occupational licensing requirements can impede job creation and slow economic growth, which undermines our Nation's prosperity and the economic well‑being of the American people.  Such regulations can prevent American workers and job seekers from earning a living, maximizing their personal and economic potential, and achieving the American Dream.  The purpose of this order is to reduce the burden of occupational regulations in order to promote the free practice of commerce, lower consumer costs, and increase economic and geographic mobility, including for military spouses.      My Administration is committed to continuing this important work by partnering with State, local, territorial, and tribal leaders throughout the country to eliminate harmful occupational regulations, which are frequently designed to protect politically connected interest groups.  To this end, in October 2019, my Administration announced the establishment of the Governors' Initiative on Regulatory Innovation, which works with State, local, and tribal leaders to advance occupational licensing reforms, better align State and Federal regulations, and eliminate unnecessary regulations that drive up consumer costs.      Occupational regulations can protect practitioners from competition rather than protect the public from malpractice.  Unfortunately, the number of occupational regulations has substantially increased over the last few decades.  Since the 1950s, the percentage of jobs requiring a government-mandated occupational license has increased from less than 5 percent to between 25 and 30 percent.  By requiring workers to acquire new licenses when they move to a new jurisdiction, occupational regulations reduce worker mobility, disproportionately harm low‑income Americans, and are particularly burdensome to military spouses who must relocate to support the service members committed to keeping our country safe.  Additionally, blanket prohibitions that prevent individuals with criminal records from obtaining occupational licenses may exacerbate disparities in employment opportunity and increase the likelihood of recidivism, particularly as regulatory barriers to enter lower- and middle-income occupations are associated with higher recidivism rates.  Licensing requirements unnecessary to protect consumers from significant and demonstrable harm also frequently impose expensive educational requirements on potential job seekers, even for occupations with limited future earnings potential.  According to recent research, licensing requirements have cost our country an estimated 2.85 million jobs and over $200 billion annually in increased consumer costs.      Therefore, it is the policy of the United States Government to support occupational regulation reform throughout the Nation, building on occupational licensing reforms enacted most recently in Arizona, Florida, Iowa, Missouri, and South Dakota, guided by six principles:      Principle 1.  All recognized occupational licensure boards should be subject to active supervision of a designated governmental agency or office.      Principle 2.  All occupational licensure boards recognized by a State, territorial, or tribal government that oversee personal qualifications related to the practice of an occupation should adopt and maintain the criteria and methods of occupational regulation that are least restrictive to competition sufficient to protect consumers from significant and demonstrable harm to their health and safety.  The policies and procedures of such boards should be designed to protect consumer and worker safety and to encourage competition.      Principle 3.  State, territorial, and tribal governments should review existing occupational regulations, including associated scope-of-practice provisions, to ensure that their requirements are the least restrictive to competition sufficient to protect consumers from significant and demonstrable harm.  State, territorial, and tribal governments should also regularly review and analyze all occupational regulations, including associated personal qualifications required to obtain an occupational license, to ensure the adoption of the least restrictive requirements necessary to protect consumers from significant and demonstrable harm.      Principle 4.  Individuals with criminal records should be encouraged to submit to the appropriate licensure board a preliminary application for an occupational license for a determination as to whether the criminal record would preclude their attainment of the appropriate occupational license.      Principle 5.  A State, territorial, or tribal government should issue an occupational license to a person in the discipline applied for and at the same level of practice if the individual satisfies four requirements:      (a) the individual holds an occupational license for that discipline from another jurisdiction in the United States and is in good standing;      (b)  the individual verifies having met, as applicable, the minimum examination, education, work, or clinical-supervision requirements imposed by the State, territory, or tribe;      (c)  the individual:           (i)    has not had the license previously revoked or suspended;           (ii)   has not been disciplined related to the license by any other regulating entity; and           (iii)  is not subject to any pending complaint, allegation, or investigation related to the license; and      (d)  the individual pays all applicable fees required to obtain the new license.      Principle 6.  Accommodations should be made for any applicant for an occupational license who is the spouse of an active duty member of the uniformed services and who is relocating with the member due to the member's official permanent change of station orders.      Sec. 2.  Review of and Report on Authorities, Regulations, Guidance, and Policies.  The head of each executive department and agency (agency) shall, within 90 days of the date of this order and every 2 years thereafter:      (a)  review the agency's authorities, regulations, guidance, and polices to identify changes necessary to ensure alignment with the principles set forth in section 1 of this order; and      (b)  submit a report to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Director of OMB), the Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy, and the Assistant to the President and Director of Intergovernmental Affairs (Director of IGA) identifying all necessary changes identified pursuant to subsection (a) of this section.      Sec. 3.  Identification and Report of Opportunities to Encourage Occupational Regulation Reform.  (a)  Within 90 days of the date of this order, and every 2 years thereafter, the head of each agency shall submit a report to the Director of OMB, the Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy, and the Director of IGA identifying a list of recommended actions available to any and all agencies to recognize and reward State, territorial, and tribal governments that have in place policies and procedures regarding occupational regulation that are consistent with the principles set forth in section 1 of this order; and      (b)  Within 120 days of the date of this order, and every 2 years thereafter, the Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Labor, the Director of OMB, the Administrator of the Small Business Administration, the Director of IGA, and the heads of other agencies and offices as appropriate, shall submit a report to the President identifying:           (i)    recommended changes to Federal law, regulations, guidance, and other policies to ensure alignment with the principles set forth in section 1 of this order;           (ii)   recommended actions to be taken by agencies to recognize and reward State, territorial, and tribal governments that have in place policies and procedures regarding occupational regulation that are consistent with the principles set forth in section 1 of this order; and           (iii)  a list of criteria that may be used to evaluate whether a State, territorial, or tribal government has in place policies and procedures that are consistent with the principles set forth in section 1 of this order.      Sec. 4.  Implementation of Recommendations to Recognize and Reward State, Territorial, and Tribal Regulatory Reform.  (a)  Within 180 days of the date of this order, and every 2 years thereafter, the Administrator of the Small Business Administration, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the heads of other agencies as appropriate, shall seek and report on information from State, territorial, and tribal governments regarding whether they have in place policies and procedures consistent with the principles set forth in section 1 of this order and shall make the report publicly available, including on agencies' websites.  The information sought shall be consistent with the criteria identified as required by section 3(b)(iii) of this order.      (b)  Consistent with applicable law, and to the extent that the President approves any of the actions recommended pursuant to section 3(b)(ii) of this order, agencies shall implement such actions for the purpose of recognizing and rewarding a State, territorial, or tribal government that has in place policies and procedures regarding occupational regulation that are consistent with the principles set forth in section 1 of this order.      Sec. 5.  Definitions.  For the purposes of this order:      (a)  "Active supervision" means:           (i)    reviewing proposed occupational licensure board rules, policies, or other regulatory actions that may restrict market competition prior to issuance;           (ii)   ensuring that any entity seeking to impose occupational licensing criteria adopts the criteria that are least restrictive to competition sufficient to protect consumers from significant and demonstrable harm to their health or safety; and           (iii)  analyzing, where information is readily available, the effects of proposed rules, policies, and other regulatory actions on employment opportunities, consumer costs, market competition, and administrative costs.      (b)  "Agency" has the meaning given that term in section 3502(1) of title 44, United States Code, except that the term does not include the agencies described in section 3502(5) of title 44, United States Code, other than the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection.      (c)  "Occupational license" means a license, registration, or certification without which an individual lacks the legal permission of a State, local, territorial, or tribal government to perform certain defined services for compensation.      (d)  "Occupational regulation" includes:           (i)   licensing or government certification, by which a government body requires personal qualifications in order to be permitted to practice an occupation; and           (ii)  registration, bonding, or inspections, by which a government body does not require personal qualifications in order to be permitted to practice an occupation.      Sec. 6.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:           (i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or           (ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.      (b)  This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.      (c)  This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.                                DONALD J. TRUMP   THE WHITE HOUSE,     December 14, 2020.

 

Office of the Press Secretary FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE December 14, 2020

Statement from the Press Secretary   Today, National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien led the United States delegation commemorating the 60th anniversary of the signing of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) convention. He delivered remarks, participated in panels on topics such as COVID-19 recovery, and held bilateral meetings with member states. Throughout these engagements, he reaffirmed the commitment of the United States to the organization as well as to the principles of free markets, fair and reciprocal trade, investment and innovation, fighting corruption, and promoting the rule of law. O’Brien also pressed the case that Chris Liddell is the right person at the right time to be the next Secretary General of the OECD.

 

Office of the Press Secretary FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE December 14, 2020

Statement from the Press Secretary Today, the Department of the Treasury announced designations on two individuals from Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security for their direct involvement in the abduction, detention, and probable death of Robert Levinson.  It is clear that not only were senior Iranian officials responsible for Mr. Levinson’s disappearance, but that they took deliberate actions to obscure their involvement through an extensive disinformation campaign.     With this announcement, the United States Government is initiating the first public actions against the Iranian government to hold them accountable for the abduction of Robert Levinson—the longest ever held American hostage.  The United States will relentlessly pursue all others involved as the investigation continues.    Since the beginning of this Administration, President Trump has made it clear that Iran will be held accountable for its use of detention and hostage taking as a tool of “diplomacy” and that the United States will no longer accept Iranian excuses for what we know they have done to Mr. Levinson.   No family should ever endure the pain the Levinson family has for nearly 14 years.  Iran is responsible and can end this nightmare by answering questions for which only they hold the answers.  Any future talks with Iran must include resolution to this case.  We stand by the Levinson family, and we will never cease in our efforts to bring justice for Bob and his family.

Background Press Call on Announcement of Designations of Iranian MOIS Officers for Their Role in the Abduction and Detention of Robert Levinson

 

Office of the Press Secretary FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE December 14, 2020

BACKGROUND PRESS CALL BY SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ON THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF DESIGNATIONS OF TWO IRANIAN MOIS OFFICERS FOR THEIR ROLE IN THE ABDUCTION AND DETENTION OF ROBERT LEVINSON   Via Teleconference     9:35 A.M. EST        SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL:  Hey, good morning everybody.  Thanks for joining the call today.  Today we have representatives from the National Security Council, the Department of Treasury, FBI, and State on this call to talk about a Department of Treasury action that’s going to be announced at 10:30 this morning.        This call is on background and embargoed until 10:30 when the Treasury announcement is made.  All of the quotes that are used from this call from the officials should be attributed to a “senior government official.”        Now, having said that, I want to run through the names and titles of our speakers, just so you know who we have here today.  The way we’ll do this, as we always do, is have brief comments at the top, then we’ll open things up to some Q&A.        So the speakers are -- the participants in today’s call: [senior government officials].        So, with that, we will get started.  And I’m going to turn it over now to [senior government official] of the National Security Council.        SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL:  Thanks.  And thanks again for everybody taking the time this morning to join the call -- an important action -- and we look forward to your questions.        But today, the Department of the Treasury is going to announce designations on two Iranian intelligence officers from the Ministry of Intelligence and Security for the direct involvement in the abduction, detention, and probable death of Robert Levinson.        These are the first public actions against the Iranian government to hold them accountable for the abduction of Mr. Levinson, the longest-held U.S. hostage ever.        We've identified two MOIS officers responsible: Mohammad Baseri and Ahmad Khazai.  But our investigation continues, and we do appreciate the work of the Department of Treasury for this action today, supported greatly by the Federal Bureau of Investigations and other U.S. government agencies.        Based on this work, we know how senior Iranian officials sanctioned Mr. Levinson's abduction and detention.  The regime also took deliberate actions to obfuscate the responsibility through an extensive disinformation campaign.  Iranian leaders have lied over and over again about what happened to Mr. Levinson, and that continues to this day.        The Trump administration has always been clear on this: We'll hold Iran accountable for its use of unlawful detention and hostage taking as a tool of foreign policy.  The United States will no longer accept Iranian excuses for what they know they have done to Mr. Levinson.        This is the worst case of Iranian hostage taking: abducting an American and holding him outside the judicial process in perpetuity, then potentially killing him.  No family should be subjected to this uncertainty -- what happened to their loved one.  After more than 13 years, the long-suffering Levinson family deserves resolution.  The United States will continue its investigation to identify more Iranian officials responsible in his abduction and will hold these hostage takers responsible.         As you know, there's a $20 million Reward for Justice and $5 million FBI reward for more information leading to Mr. Levinson's return, and we hope today's action will help increase and improve our odds of resolving this.        Any talks with Iran must include a resolution to this case, and we've been insistent on it from the beginning.  Levinson must be included on any list of Americans detained in Iran and must be returned to the United States.  We will not cease our efforts until all Americans are returned home.        And I appreciate, again, your time.  And I appreciate the efforts today at Treasury, the FBI, State Department, and other colleagues.        And, with that, I'll pass it the next speaker.  Thank you.        SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL:  Yeah.  Treasury, go ahead.        SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL:  Thanks.  As my colleague just noted: For 13 years, the Iranian government denied knowledge of the whereabouts or condition of Mr. Robert Levinson, who was abducted on or about March 9, 2007, on Iran's Kish Island.        Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated and revealed the identity of these two senior officials of the MOIS who were involved in the abduction and detention of Mr. Levinson in Iran.  The individuals designated today, Mohammad Baseri and Ahmad Khazai, acted in their capacity as MOIS officers in the abduction, detention, and probable death of Mr. Levinson.        Senior Iranian officials authorized these actions and launched a disinformation campaign to deflect blame from the Iranian regime.  Mohammad Baseri is a high-ranking MOIS officer involved in counter-espionage activities in and outside of Iran.  Baseri has worked directly with intelligence officials from other countries to target and harm U.S. interests.        Ahmad Khazai is also a high-ranking member of the MOIS, who has led MOIS delegations to other countries to assess the security situation.          Today, OFAC is designating Baseri and Khazai for acting for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Iran’s MOIS.  These actions are being taken pursuant to our Iran human rights executive order, EO 13553.        The MOIS has been designated under this executive order for being complicit in the commission of serious human rights abuses against the Iranian people since June 2009.  The MOIS is also designated as a global terrorist, pursuant to executive order 13224.        I'd now like to pass it over to my colleague from the FBI.        SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL:  Good morning.  Again, [senior government official] from the Hostage Recovery Fusion Cell.  I’d like to thank you all for taking the time to be on the call.  And, again, thank you to all my colleagues.  And thank you to all the U.S. government officials that have worked on this effort to date.         As we all know, the U.S. government and the U.S. people know that the Iranian regime has a really long and cruel history for taking Americans for political leverage.  This is very personal here at the FBI, and it's very meaningful to see this announcement today.         As you all know, probably, Bob Levinson served the U.S. government for 28 years in both the DEA and the FBI.  But more importantly, Bob is a husband, he's a brother, he's a father of seven, and now he's a grandfather of seven.  So we're hoping today’s designation puts a responsibility squarely on the Iranian regime for the first time and these two senior officers.  And we hope that this gives Bob's family some of the answers they deserve.  But by no means do we acknowledge the fact that this does not bring Bob's family home.  But it's still a very important acknowledgement, and it's probably long overdue.         We are still working hard to bring him home and bring justice and closure to his family.  By no means is this the end of the story.         In three months, we're going to mark the 14th anniversary of Bob's disappearance.  We hope that today's demonstration is that the entire U.S. government is still standing with Bob's family.  This is by no means the end of our commitment to that family, be it the Hostage Recovery Fusion Cell, all my colleagues in the FBI, and across the U.S. government are going to continue to work this matter.  And we're not going to rest until every American held captive in Iran, be it Bob, Siamak Namazi, Baquer Namazi, Morad Tahbaz, or any other hostage being held today comes home.         Thank you.         SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL:  Okay.  State?         SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL:  Thanks.  I'll be brief.  We are emphasizing that senior Iranian officials sanction the operation that abducted and detained and probably killed Bob Levinson, and then has lied about it over and over again.  The regime in Iran is 41 years old, and it has a 41-year record of hostage taking, which is -- or should be a reminder to Americans about the great danger of travel to Iran, probably most of all for dual citizens of Iran and the U.S.        As was just noted, there are three Americans detained in Iran now -- Baquer Namazi, who’s 84 years old, but they won't let him return to the U.S.; Siamak Namazi, his son; and Morad Tahbaz -- all of whom we are working literally every day to try to free for a return to the United States.        Finally, just to repeat one last point, there should be no agreement negotiated with Iran ever again that doesn't free the Americans who are unjustly detained in that country.  We all expect a negotiation next year.  That negotiation must include the return home of all the Americans unjustly detained in that country.        SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL:  All right.  Thank you, [senior government official].  Appreciate that.         So we will now open it up for a few questions.  Since we have several participants here, when you come on, first of all, if you could identify your news organization, and then if you have a question directed towards anyone in particular, if you could just specify.         So, with that, we can go ahead and start the questions.        Q    Hi, there.  Thanks for doing this call.  [Senior government official] might be best placed to answer this, but whoever wants to answer.  I was wondering if there's any new information that led you to this designation today.  Is there something new that you found out that made you determine Iran's involvement, as you say?         And can you say what you think the motivation was for targeting Mr. Levinson?  Thank you.        SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL:  I think I'd probably refer that to maybe FBI.        SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL:  Sure.  You know, this has been a process that we've been moving towards.  I'm not going to really discuss the specifics as to how we came to the conclusion and designated these two individuals, as we have to be careful about protecting intelligence sources and methods.        SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL:  I don't think we can give you more than that, actually.  I can't -- I can't get into their heads and figure out why they would do this.  You know, logic would suggest the desire to seize and question someone who had spent his career in law enforcement in the United States, but that's a deduction.        Q    Yes, hi.  Thanks for sharing this.  To put a finer point on Shaun's question: How long has this been in the works?  Is there a particular reason why now, in mid-December, you're rolling this designation out?  And separately, are you concerned at all that this would have a negative impact on the Americans who are currently detained in Iran?  Thank you.         SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL:  Well, on the latter point, I would say no.  We are working for their release, and we want Iran to be clear that we will never stop working for their release, and we will never drop the case of any American who comes to harm in Iran, no matter how many years go by.  I don’t think that’s a disincentive; I would hope it’s an incentive.         Q    For [senior government official], you described how a senior Iranian official sanctioned the plot.  Can you talk about that a little more?  What evidence you have of that.         And then, zooming back out to repeat a version of what Shaun asked: What information do you have that has led you to believe -- to suggest that Mr. Levinson -- I believe the phrase was the “probable death”?  Can you talk about the information that you have going into that assessment?  Thanks.        SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL:  I’ll leave that part to, I think, the FBI, because I think they're best suited to do this. This case is 13 years old, and there have been a long series of official lies about it, from the top of the Iranian government and from spokespeople for the Iranian government.  We also know about the two individuals who were sanctioned today, and they know about the attention that this case continues to get at the highest levels of the U.S. government.         So without getting into the question of what intel we have, I think it's very clear that this case was well understood, well known at very high levels in the Iranian government.  This is not something that has been hidden and comes as a surprise to the top leaders.         SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL:  As to the term “probable death” and why we use that: I'll just say that the U.S. government determined that all the evidence that we have to date likely points to Bob's death while in captivity, but we're still continuing to work to see if we can get any more information and develop the necessary evidence.         We're actually also hopeful that today's public naming of these MOIS officials for their involvement in Bob's disappearance will hopefully lead to some others coming forward with information about Bob and people involved in its hostage taking.        As the Director of the FBI, Chris Wray, told his workforce earlier this year, the interagency came to this determination that the most likely or credible evidence collected over the past 13 years that we have now is that the likelihood is that Bob died in captivity.  Now, that still does not mean that the U.S. government has given up on finding out what happened to Bob.  We’re going to keep working doggedly to determine any circumstances surrounding his abduction and his time in captivity so that we can find the answers that we all want and that the Levinson family deserves.        Q    Hi, thank you so much for doing this.  I was wondering if you could talk a little bit about the timing of this announcement.  Obviously, we're in the final weeks of the Trump administration.  Is there something specific to take away as to why this announcement is being made now when the actual announcement about his probable death was back in March?  Can you talk a little about the specifics of, you know, why we're having this now?  Thank you.        SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL:  Hey, Eric, appreciate the question.  This is [senior government official] at the NSC.         So, two things.  First is, you know, we have been doggedly pursuing this and every other case.  It's one of the most complex and challenging, as everyone recognizes.  It's been going on for a very long time.  It's a testament, I think, to our colleagues in the FBI, Treasury, and other departments and agencies, the U.S. government, to obtain the information.         But we take our actions based on the information available.  So as soon as the conclusion was made, the actions were processed, and we're holding the individuals accountable, and we're holding the Iranian government accountable.         And so there is no -- there's nothing really to read into the timing of it.  It is independent of any other decisions and discussions.  It is strictly based on our obtaining the information and processing them accordingly and holding the Iranians accountable.  But thanks for the question.        Q    Hi, yes.  Hi, good morning.  Thanks for doing this.  I'm just wondering -- sorry, if this has been asked -- but why did you wait this long to sanction these officers?  And can you give us any more information whether they're still involved, you know, with other U.S. hostages taken in Iran?        SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL:  This is [senior government official] again.  I'll pick up, and then other colleagues can jump in with amplifying information and thoughts.  I go back to the comments I made to Eric.  There's no -- there's no reason we took this long other than it's a complex case, obtaining the information and processing it.  And all due diligence required -- you know, necessitated the release at this time.  So as soon as we obtained the information, we could determine culpability, we could issue the actions.  That's the only real criteria for issuing this action at this time.  We didn't delay, but we also didn't skip any steps in the process.        But I will, again, state that this is a very complex case.  Iran is a very difficult place to obtain information required in order to process these actions.  And, again, I just want to thank our FBI, Treasury, and other colleagues to get to the point where we could take effective action.        As stated at the top and reemphasized by all of us, this is the first time we're holding the Iranian government accountable.  And we're naming individuals, and we're employing the authorities that we've been given in order to do so.  But would welcome thoughts and other comments by my colleagues.        SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL: I would only add that these decisions that -- to sanction individuals really require a lengthy process and involve a lot of lawyers.  The lawyers determine whether the evidence we have is legally sufficient for sanctions determination, and that is one of the explanations.        As [senior government official] says, you can imagine the difficulty of determining the involvement of individuals in the MOIS in this case.  So it's a long process and a careful process.  And when the process came to an end and we thought we have enough evidence, and it got through the lawyers, that's when the government acted.        SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL:  Maybe we can just take one more question.        Q    Good morning.  One question for [senior government official].  Can you explain the implications of the sanctions that you're announcing today?  And given that, I'm guessing, most MOIS officers or operatives do not have foreign bank accounts, you know, what is this really going to do to either of those two?         And for [senior government official], you said that never again -- you said that everyone expects there to be a negotiation with Iran next year, and there should be no agreement negotiated with Iran ever again.  That doesn't free the Americans who are unjustly detained.  What other things -- what conditions do you think should be placed on any negotiations that a Biden administration might seek, or any agreement they might reach with Iran on the nuclear program?  Thank you.        SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL:  Thanks.  I’ll take the first part of the question, if that’s all right.        SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL:  Yeah, sure.        SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL:  Thanks.  Yeah, thanks for the question, Arshad.  So you're right: These two MOIS officers, it's unlikely -- I don't know for sure -- that they have bank accounts in the United States.  However, secondary sanctions do attach to this action.  And as we noted in our press release and in the remarks, these individuals have met directly with intelligence officials from other countries.  They have also led MOIS delegations.  There are secondary sanctions implications for any of their external dealings outside of Iran.  It is one part of a pressure campaign, though.        Let me turn it over to [senior government official] for the remainder of your question.        SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL:  Baquer Namazi was imprisoned in 2016 when he went to Iran to visit his son who was already imprisoned.  And the agreement that we made in 2015 was made at a time when Siamak Namazi was already unjustly imprisoned in Iran.  So the agreement was made despite his imprisonment, and his liberation was not part of it.  That's what I'm saying should never happen again.  No more big agreements with Iran that ignore and, in a sense, abandon Americans who are in prison there.  They must be freed.         I don't want, Arshad, to get into a discussion here of, “Well, you know, what about all the other issues that we have about missiles or the nuclear program, or so on?”  Because that's not the purpose of this call.         But Bob Levinson’s case is a reminder that there are other Americans imprisoned in Iran.  And I think it's right to make the point that any negotiations with Iran have to include these Americans and have to bring them home.        SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL:  Okay, very good.  Thank you, everybody.  Appreciate everybody jumping on today.         Just want to remind everyone of the ground rules that were stated at the beginning of this call: that this is on background, attributed to “senior government officials,” and that it is embargoed until 10:30, once Treasury announces the sanctions.  So look for that in a little over a half hour.        Again, just want to thank everyone -- the speakers for joining -- and all of you for calling in today.  Have a great day.                                                    END                 9:56 A.M. EST