Executive Order on Providing an Order of Succession Within the Environmental Protection Agency

 

Office of the Press Secretary FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE January 8, 2021 EXECUTIVE ORDER - - - - - - - PROVIDING AN ORDER OF SUCCESSION WITHIN  THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY        By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, as amended, 5 U.S.C. 3345 et seq. (the "Act"), it is hereby ordered as follows:     Section 1.  Order of Succession.  Subject to the provisions of section 2 of this order, and to the limitations set forth in the Act, the following officials of the Environmental Protection Agency, in the order listed, shall act as and perform the functions and duties of the office of the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (Administrator) during any period in which the Administrator and the Deputy Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency have died, resigned, or otherwise become unable to perform the functions and duties of the office of Administrator:       (a)  General Counsel;     (b)  Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste (also known as the Assistant Administrator for the Office of Land and Emergency Management);     (c)  Assistant Administrator for Toxic Substances (also known as the Assistant Administrator for the Office of Chemical Safety and Pollution Prevention);     (d)  Assistant Administrator for the Office of Air and Radiation;     (e)  Assistant Administrator for the Office of Water;     (f)  Assistant Administrator for the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance;     (g)  Chief Financial Officer;     (h)  Assistant Administrator for the Office of Research and Development;      (i)  Assistant Administrator for the Office of International and Tribal Affairs;     (j)  Assistant Administrator for the Office of Mission Support;      (k)  Associate Deputy Administrator for Programs;     (l)  Associate Deputy Administrator;     (m)  Regional Administrator, Region VIII;     (n)  Principal Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Office of Mission Support;     (o)  Deputy Regional Administrator, Region VIII;     (p)  Principal Deputy General Counsel; and     (q)  Principal Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance.      Sec. 2.  Exceptions.  (a)  No individual who is serving in an office listed in section 1(a)-(q) of this order in an acting capacity shall, by virtue of so serving, act as Administrator pursuant to this order.     (b)  No individual listed in section 1(a)-(q) of this order shall act as Administrator unless that individual is otherwise eligible to so serve under the Act.     (c)  Notwithstanding the provisions of this order, the President retains discretion, to the extent permitted by law, to depart from this order in designating an acting Administrator.      Sec. 3.  Revocation.  Executive Order 13763 of January 13, 2017 (Providing an Order of Succession Within the Environmental Protection Agency), is hereby revoked.      Sec. 4.  General Provision.  This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.                          DONALD J. TRUMP   THE WHITE HOUSE,     January 8, 2021.

Memorandum on Providing an Order of Succession Within the United States International Development Finance Corporation

 

Office of the Press Secretary FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE January 8, 2021

January 8, 2021       MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE UNITED STATES                  INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION   SUBJECT:       Providing an Order of Succession Within the                United States International Development                Finance Corporation   By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, as amended, 5 U.S.C. 3345 et seq. (the "Act"), I hereby direct the following:        Section 1.  Order of Succession.  Subject to the provisions of section 2 of this memorandum, and to the limitations set forth in the Act, the following officers of the United States International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), in the order listed, shall act as and perform the functions and duties of the office of the Chief Executive Officer of DFC during any period in which the Chief Executive Officer of DFC has died, resigned, or otherwise become unable to perform the functions and duties of the office of the Chief Executive Officer of DFC:        (a)  Deputy Chief Executive Officer;        (b)  Chief Operating Officer;        (c)  Executive Vice President for Strategy;        (d)  Chief of Staff;        (e)  Vice President and General Counsel;        (f)  Deputy General Counsel;        (g)  Vice President, Structured Finance and Insurance;        (h)  Vice President, Development Credit; and        (i)  Chief Financial Officer and Vice President, Finance.        Sec. 2.  Exceptions.  (a)  No individual who is serving in an office listed in section 1 of this memorandum in an acting capacity shall, by virtue of so serving, act as Chief Executive Officer of DFC pursuant to this memorandum.        (b)  No individual who is serving in an office listed in section 1 of this memorandum shall act as Chief Executive Officer of DFC unless that individual is otherwise eligible to so serve under the Act.        (c)  Notwithstanding the provisions of this memorandum, the President retains discretion, to the extent permitted by law, to depart from this memorandum in designating an acting Chief Executive Officer of DFC.        Sec. 3.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this memorandum shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:             (i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or             (ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.        (b)  This memorandum shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.        (c)  This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.        Sec. 4.  You are authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the Federal Register.                                      DONALD J. TRUMP

Three Nominations and One Withdrawal Sent to the Senate

 

Office of the Press Secretary FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE January 7, 2021

NOMINATIONS SENT TO THE SENATE:      Jason Abend, of Virginia, to be Inspector General, Department of Defense, vice Jon T. Rymer, resigned.      William Patrick Joseph Kimmitt, of Virginia, to be a Member of the United States International Trade Commission for a term expiring June 16, 2029, vice F. Scott Kieff, term expired.      Barbera Hale Thornhill, of California, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Republic of Singapore. WITHDRAWAL SENT TO THE SENATE:      Chad F. Wolf, of Virginia, to be Secretary of Homeland Security, vice Kirstjen Nielsen, resigned, which was sent to the Senate on January 3, 2021.

REMARKS BY PRESS SECRETARY KAYLEIGH MCENANY James S. Brady Press Briefing Room

 

Office of the Press Secretary FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE January 7, 2021

REMARKS BY PRESS SECRETARY KAYLEIGH MCENANY   James S. Brady Press Briefing Room     5:18 P.M. EST        MS. MCENANY:  I am here to deliver this message on behalf of the entire White House.  Let me be clear: The violence we saw yesterday at our nation's Capitol was appalling, reprehensible, and antithetical to the American way.  We condemn it -- the President and this administration -- in the strongest possible terms.  It is unacceptable, and those that broke the law should be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.        I stood here at this podium the day after a historic church burned amid violent riots, and I said this: “The First Amendment guarantees the right of the people to peaceably assemble.  What we saw last night in Washington and across the country was not that.”  End quote.  Make no mistake: What we saw yesterday afternoon in the halls of our Capitol, likewise, was not that.        We grieve for the loss of life and those injured, and we hold them in our prayers and close to our hearts at this time.  We thank our valiant law enforcement officers who are true American heroes.        What we saw yesterday was a group of violent rioters undermining the legitimate First Amendment rights of the many thousands who came to peacefully have their voices heard in our nation's capital.  Those who violently besieged our Capitol are the opposite of everything this administration stands for.  The core value of our administration is the idea that all citizens have the right to live in safety, peace, and freedom.         Those who are working in this building are working to ensure an orderly transition of power.  Now it is time for America to unite, to come together to reject the violence that we have seen.  We are one American people under God.        Thank you very much.                                        END           5:20 P.M. EST

Statement from the Press Secretary

 

Office of the Press Secretary FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE January 5, 2021

Statement from the Press Secretary  Antifa activists have brutally attacked our law-abiding friends, neighbors, and business owners, and destroyed historic landmarks that our communities have cherished for decades.  This violence and lawlessness has no place in the United States and will be called out for the domestic terrorism that it is.  Today, President Donald J. Trump signed a memorandum to ensure that Federal officials assess actions of Antifa activists in light of Federal laws that restrict the entry of aliens associated with terrorist organizations and aliens intent on criminal activity.  President Trump will not allow Antifa, or any terrorist organization, to destroy our great country.

Memorandum on Inadmissibility of Persons Affiliated with Antifa Based on Organized Criminal Activity

 

Office of the Press Secretary FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE January 5, 2021

January 5, 2021         MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE                THE ATTORNEY GENERAL                THE SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY   SUBJECT:       Inadmissibility of Persons Affiliated with Antifa Based on Organized Criminal Activity    By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:        Section 1.  Purpose.  One of the fundamental purposes of our Government is to ensure the safety of our citizens.  Consistent with the purpose of creating peaceful and prosperous communities, Federal law ensures immigration benefits may be granted only to those individuals who will follow the laws that govern all United States citizens.  Accordingly, section 212(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3), renders inadmissible aliens who have engaged or who are likely to engage in terrorist activity and those aliens who seek entry into the United States to engage, principally or incidentally, in unlawful activity.  Active membership in a criminal association is relevant to the determination of whether an applicant for a visa or other immigration benefit is seeking to enter the United States to engage in unlawful activity.  Accordingly, law enforcement organizations, including the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security, should continue to provide the Department of State with current information appropriate for updating the list of criminal organizations in the Foreign Affairs Manual at 9 FAM 302.5-4(B)(2).  This information should include assessments of whether aliens involved with such associations pose a threat to the safety of our communities.        In particular, reliable reporting suggests that the movement known as Antifa is directly or indirectly responsible for some of the recent lawlessness in our communities, and has exploited tragedies to advance a radical, leftist, anarchist, and often violent agenda.  In fact, Antifa has long used otherwise permissible demonstrations to engage in lawless, criminal behavior to further its radical agenda.         Between February and August 2017, during a series of protests in Berkeley, California, Antifa protesters physically assaulted several individuals and caused significant property damage.  Specifically, reports indicate that during the August 27, 2017, protest, black-clad Antifa protestors viciously attacked a rally, including targeting at least one person because of his conservative political beliefs.  These protests resulted in 13 arrests on a range of charges, including assault with a deadly weapon and obstructing a police officer.  During the demonstrations on February 1, 2017, 150 black-clad agitators contributed to an estimated $100,000 worth of property damage in Berkeley.  Separately, on June 29, 2019, individuals affiliated with Antifa physically attacked conservative journalist Andy Ngo while he was covering demonstrations in Portland, Oregon, leaving him hospitalized.         Those affiliated with Antifa have also repeatedly threatened violence, including against law enforcement officers.  For instance, in June 2018, a Twitter account linked to Antifa shared the names of more than 1,500 Immigration and Customs Enforcement employees, leading others to track and publicly post some employees' social media profiles, phone numbers, and home addresses, which, as intended, resulted in the employees being harassed.        In late September of 2020, individuals in a moving truck distributed riot equipment -- including shields, masks, and a sign emblazoned with an Antifa symbol -- in Louisville, Kentucky, before riots ensued there.  Hours later, the violent situation resulted in the shooting of two police officers.  And on October 5, 2020, reported Antifa activists in Portland were captured on video attacking a woman carrying an American flag.        The Department of Justice has already publicly confirmed that actions by Antifa and similar groups meet the standard for domestic terrorism.         The violence spurred on by Antifa -- such as hurling projectiles and incendiary devices at police, burning vehicles, and violently confronting police in defiance of local curfews -- is dangerous to human life and to the fabric of our Nation.  These violent acts undermine the rights of peaceful protestors and destroy the lives, liberty, and property of the people of this Nation, especially those most vulnerable.       Sec. 2.  Inadmissibility of Antifa Associates Based on Terrorist and Unlawful Activity.  (a)  The Secretary of State shall, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security, review information received from the Department of Justice and other authorities to assess whether to classify Antifa as a terrorist organization under section 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi) of title 8, United States Code.        (b)  The Secretary of State shall take all appropriate steps, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security, to consider listing Antifa in 9 FAM 302.5-4(B)(2)(U) Aliens Who Are Members of an Identified Criminal Organization.        Sec. 3.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this memorandum shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:             (i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or             (ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.        (b)  This memorandum shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.        (c)  This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.                                      DONALD J. TRUMP

BACKGROUND PRESS CALL BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS ON AN EXECUTIVE ORDER TO ADDRESS THREATS POSED BY APPLICATIONS AND SOFTWARE DEVELOPED BY CHINESE COMPANIES

 

Office of the Press Secretary FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE January 5, 2021 BACKGROUND PRESS CALL BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS ON AN EXECUTIVE ORDER TO ADDRESS THREATS POSED BY APPLICATIONS AND SOFTWARE DEVELOPED BY CHINESE COMPANIES   Via Teleconference     6:36 P.M. EST        SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Good evening, everyone, and thanks for joining the call with short notice.  I really appreciate it.  You’ve probably seen the EO already, and so tonight we’ve got two officials from the NSC on to talk about the EO that was signed on the threats posed by software developed or controlled by Chinese companies.        This call is on background, which means that quotes used from officials on this call must be attributed to a “senior administration official” or “senior administration officials.”        Having said that, I’ll introduce who’s on the call, just for your reference.  We will have brief comments at the top and then open things up to Q&A.        The participants for the call are [senior administration officials].        So, with that, we will get started, and I’ll turn it over to [senior administration official] first, and we anticipate just having [senior administration official] give comments, and then we will have questions after that, respecting everyone’s time.        Thank you very much.        SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Thanks so much for joining us.  And as [senior administration official] said, I’m [senior administration official] here at the National Security Council.        So, assuming that folks have seen or are looking at the EO, we’ll kind of keep it brief upfront, and then we’ll open it up to some questions.  So, just in a couple of minutes, we want to make it clear -- and I think the executive order that you’re looking at makes it clear -- that the President has no higher priority than the safety and security of the American people.         This executive order addresses a continuing and, really, a growing, over the last years, threat that’s posed by the Chinese Communist Party and, in this particular case, through Chinese software applications.        By accessing our personal electronic devices, such as smartphones, tablets, even computers, connected software applicants can and often do access and capture vast amounts of information from the users of those devices.  Oftentimes that can be, as we all know, sensitive personally identifiable information or just sort of private or privileged information.        We understand that this could provide the government of the PRC and really, frankly, the Chinese Communist Party with access to information that they can then exploit against the United States -- either our government or individuals or businesses and other entities here in America.        I think we’re all aware that Beijing requires, really, all commercial companies, no matter how large or small, to support the Chinese Communist Party’s political objectives.  We’ve seen recently from Chinese regulators that they’ve demonstrated just this -- in the case of news, for example, about Alibaba or even the Ant Group.  And there are other examples, obviously, cropping up really almost every week.        So I think everyone is also aware that the CCP -- the Chinese Communist Party’s mil-civ fusion strategy explicitly aims to either co-opt or, in cases, even coerce civilian enterprises into assisting with modernization and development of the People’s Liberation Army.  We don’t think necessarily that, you know, Americans’ sensitive information and data, either from companies or individuals, should be contributing to that cause.        This executive order tasks the Secretary of Commerce to identify prohibited transactions involving eight named Chinese software applications.  Three of those eight are actually payment services, as you probably noticed.  And this tasking to the Secretary of Commerce is generally similar to what was passed in the two August executive orders that implicated WeChat and TikTok.        This executive order today, though, that the President signed also does two other things.  It directs the Secretary to identify and take appropriate actions against other software applications -- so, beyond the 8 -- and now, really, 10 that have been named -- and to take, you know -- as we said, take appropriate action to get those; and also to make recommendations on how the United States should develop a program to control the export of U.S. personal identifiable or U.S. user data, generally in the bulk form, to foreign adversaries.             So, again, you know, this administration and the President has for the last four years and will continue to prioritize the safety and security of the U.S. homeland and the American people.        And with that, we’ll open it up to some questions.        SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  So, actually, before we open it up, actually -- so, once again, we’ve got [senior administration official] here, as well as [senior administration official].  But thank you for that.        So, Operator, we will now open it up for a few questions.  The Operator is going to identify your line number, so you will know what line is opened up.  And then if you could please identify yourself and your outlet before asking your question, and then it’ll go on mute at that point.        So we’ll take as many questions as we can, respecting everyone’s time.  Go ahead with questions please, Operator.        Q    Thank you.  This is Steven Overly from Politico.  I wanted to ask a question.  The executive order that -- or the two executive orders from August targeting WeChat and TikTok were heard by the courts and have been temporarily paused.  I wondered if you might comment on whether this executive order could see a similar fate in the courts or whether you’re pursuing things differently this time.  Thank you.        SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Hey, Steven.  That’s a great question.  So, we continue to believe that those two executive orders are obviously valid and should be implemented, and we continue to fight that battle, if you will, in the courts.  And, obviously, we sincerely hope and expect to win that.        And so that doesn’t prejudice our decisions going forward or that our opinion on how that should turn out does, you know, influence what we’re doing in the sense that we’re going to continue to take the right action.        I will say that those injunctions -- and I would defer you to DOJ for confirmation, but our belief is that those injunctions -- and this is public information -- are being blocked under a First Amendment clause within IEEPA, and they are probably more closely tied to social media applications in that sense.  And that particular case would probably not be easily brought against some of these other applications that we’ve named today.        Q    Alex Alper with Reuters.  I just wanted to ask about the types of transactions that you envision the Commerce Department blocking.  Would this include, you know, payment to employees?  Or would it really just be about the companies that, like, host the apps on phones?  Would it be the users?  Who do you see as affected by it, and what sorts of transactions would you like to see banned?        SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Hey, Alex.  So I think the best expectations that we would have -- at least, you know, right now, before final decisions are made -- is that it would look a lot like what you saw the Commerce regulatory framework that was published to implement those August 6th executive orders on TikTok and WeChat.        And so, you know, to answer the specific question: No, it would not target employees.  We do not expect that at this time.         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Thank you, Operator.  And thanks, Alex.  Operator, we’ll go ahead and take the next question please.        Q    Hey, guys.  This is Justin Sink at Bloomberg.  I was wondering if you could talk about the 45-day timeline on the executive order.  Obviously, that pushes things into the next administration.  And without getting sidetracked on that, I’m wondering if there’s any expectation that you could accelerate that at all, or if not, how or if you expect the incoming administration to, sort of, handle this now that you guys have set it out.        SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Hey, thanks for that question.  So there was really no consideration given to, you know, attempt to accelerate on anything.  We think 45 days is the appropriate timeline for implementation, just as you saw with the August EOs.  And, really, the question of if and when anything would change would probably be appropriate for that next administration.        SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Thank you, Operator.  We’ll go ahead and take the next question.        Q    Hi, there.  This is Owen Churchill with the South China Morning Post.  Thanks a lot for the briefing.  I just have a couple of very quick questions.  The first: I’m wondering if you could elaborate on how you came to focus in on these particular eight companies, whether you have any kind of specific evidence of U.S. -- individual states that are being used for, you know, the kind of malignant purposes that you outlined at the top.        And then, secondly, I just wanted to follow up on a prior question.  Would this cover individual transactions?  For example, a user of WeChat Pay just sending money to another contact through the app.  Would that be covered under this?  Thank you.        SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  So, on the first question, the software applications that were chosen were largely chosen based on risk.  We cannot get into whether and what type of information we may or may not have regarding specific applications, you know, that -- and what other nefarious or otherwise activity is being done by some of these companies.  But what the executive order is based on is it’s based on risk.         And so I think what you’ll find, if you look up some of these apps, is they all have extremely high numbers of users/download.  And that means to us that they are found on extremely large numbers.  You know, we’re talking tens of millions of devices.  And, you know, the mass collection of information and data going into, you know, PRC, whatever government department, AI algorithms, or what have you -- the potential for that is what we’re talking about: the risk.         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Operator, we’ll go ahead and take the next question.        Q    Hi, it’s Stephanie Dhue with CNBC.  Thanks for the call.  So, what information changed to cause the administration to do this now versus earlier in the process?  What informed your timing?        SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  So, I can tell you that a lot -- like, a lot of the actions that this administration has embarked on in our, you know, general strategic competition with China are probably late.  But better late than never in the sense that, you know, maybe late that they should’ve been done, you know, in a prior -- years ago.         And so we’re -- we’ve had a lot of catching up to do.  And I think if you look at the record that we’ve been actually quite busy.  And so I wouldn’t say the timing is any particular -- I wouldn’t try to tie it to, you know, the end of -- or potential end of an administration or anything like that.  I think we just need to look at the overall threat to the American people, and, you know, that we’re going to take some actions to counter that threat.        SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Operator, we’ll go ahead and take three more questions.        Q    Hi, Bobby Allyn here with NPR.  Thanks for taking my question.  So, as it’s been noted, you know, the previous EO back in August targeting WeChat -- with that halted in the Court, I’m why there is another -- you know, another attempt here to go after WeChat and not ByteDance, which is TikTok’s owner, because ByteDance has been making moves in the e-payment world, and there’s been talk of TikTok even developing some kind of e-payment service.  So I’m wondering why ByteDance wasn’t among the Chinese companies listed in this EO.        SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  So, thank you for your question.  It’s a great question.  One of the items that obviously we’re looking at, and one of the pieces that is in this executive order, is for the Secretary of Commerce to continue to review and assess applications related -- and related companies that would be appropriate for further action.         So, that -- this is an evolutionary process as we continue to assess a wide range of risks to national security and take appropriate action as we work through these different issues.         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Great.  Two more -- two more questions, Operator.        Q    Hi, this is Brett Fortnam with Inside U.S. Trade.  In terms of the transition, have you communicated with the Biden team about this order and this -- actually, since that 45-day timeline is going to go past January 20th?  Has there been any question on how that order will be carried out?        SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  The potential transition activity with the possible incoming Biden administration does not involve -- that is just potential transition-related activity through GSA, and it does not cover this EO.         Operator, we’ll go ahead and take one last question.        Q    Hi, Dave Perera from MLex.  Thank you so much for taking my question.  I wonder if you can elaborate a little bit on the national security risks at hand here.  The executive order, for example, cites the hacks of OPM and the hack of Anthem at the behest of Chinese hacking groups.  But I suppose you're not intimating that these apps are hacking into the devices of their users.  So there's no hacking going on here.  What's the national security risk?        SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Hi, Dave.  Thanks.  And it’s a great question.  I'm glad you asked it.  And what we’re really talking about here is the risks of giving exabytes of data, really granular data on the American people and people trusting the American, you know, commercial infrastructure with really sensitive information and handing that over to a totalitarian, fascist, technology-enabled dictatorship run by the Chinese Communist Party.         And if you look at what that totalitarian, fascist, technology-enabled communist dictatorship does, it uses mass amounts of information in order to control and oppress its people.  It oppresses -- it uses that data to oppress the Uighurs.  It uses that data to oppress the people of Hong Kong.  And it’s using that data to try and oppress peoples outside of Chinese geographic perimeter today in various countries.        And what we’re trying to do is articulate to the world and then take concrete steps here in the United States to stop the encroachment of China’s big-data strategy here in the United States and prevent the data of the American people and of their, you know, intimate information -- photos off of their phones, text messages, phone calls to their parents; maybe those parents are abroad, et cetera, et cetera -- from being fed into this mass tool for global oppression.         And so, you know, when you look at these applications, and when you look at the direction given to the Secretary of Commerce, what you see is one step among many that the President has taken over the past four years to fight back against that digital totalitarianism.  And here what we’re doing is blocking the transfer of really sensitive information from the American people and for people using American telecommunications networks and technologies from just being funneled into these terrifying databases that, as we see, they apply to more and more people every day.         And so, you know, I think it really -- I think every American ought to look at what these apps seek to do.  It’s just -- you know, there's a lot of it here in these materials, in terms of what happens when you allow these applications to gain access to your phone, what information they pass back, essentially to the Chinese Communist Party, to people that are by law -- by Chinese law required to comply with the secret directives of the Chinese Communist Party.         And, I mean, it’s really terrifying.  And not only is it terrifying, but it’s illiberal.  Right?  It essentially feeds them tools of mass oppression for billions of people worldwide.  And we’re just not interested in facilitating that.        SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Great.  Thanks very much, [senior administration official], and thanks, [senior administration official], for your answers.         And thanks, everyone, for participating here this evening.         Once again, just as a reminder, the ground rules that we stated at the top of the call: This is on background, attributed to a “senior administration official” or “senior administration officials.”        Thanks again, everyone.  And if you have other questions, please go ahead and email us through the NSC Press distro.  Thank you, Operator.                                          END          6:58 P.M. EST

Statement from National Security Advisor Robert C. O’Brien on the Executive Order Addressing Chinese Software Applications

 

Office of the Press Secretary FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE January 5, 2021

Statement from National Security Advisor Robert C. O’Brien on the Executive Order Addressing Chinese Software Applications Today, President Donald J. Trump signed an executive order addressing the continuing threat posed by Chinese software applications.  The Chinese government requires that all commercial companies, big and small, support the Chinese Communist Party’s political objectives as Chinese regulators have recently demonstrated.  China’s Military-Civil Fusion strategy explicitly aims to co-opt or coerce civilian enterprises into assisting the People’s Liberation Army.  This executive order tasks the Secretary of Commerce to identify prohibited transactions involving eight Chinese software applications, including payment services; directs the Secretary of Commerce to identify and take appropriate action against other software applications; and develops a program to control the export of exploitable United States user data to foreign adversaries.  President Trump continues to prioritize the safety and security of the United States homeland and the American people.

Bill Announcement

 

Office of the Press Secretary FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE January 5, 2021

On Tuesday, January 5, 2021, the President signed into law:     H.R. 1240, the “Young Fishermen's Development Act,” which requires the Commerce Department to establish the Young Fishermen's Development Grant Program to provide training, education, outreach, and technical assistance initiatives for young fishermen;   H.R. 1503, the “Orange Book Transparency Act of 2020,” which amends the types of patents and exclusivity-related information for approved drugs listed in a publication of the Food and Drug Administration;   H.R. 1966, the “Henrietta Lacks Enhancing Cancer Research Act of 2019,” which requires GAO to complete a study on barriers to participation in Federally funded cancer clinical trials by populations that have been traditionally underrepresented in such trials;   H.R. 2468, the “School-Based Allergies and Asthma Management Program Act,” which increases the preference given, in awarding allergy and asthma-related grants, to States that require public schools to have allergy and asthma management programs;   H.R. 3976, which designates the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 12711 East Jefferson Avenue in Detroit, Michigan, as the Aretha Franklin Post Office Building;   H.R. 4031, the “Great Lakes Restoration Initiative Act of 2019 or the GLRI Act of 2019,” which reauthorizes the Great Lakes Restoration Initiative through FY 2026;   H.R. 4983, which designates the Department of Veterans Affairs community-based outpatient clinic in Gilbert, Arizona, as the Staff Sergeant Alexander W. Conrad Veterans Affairs Health Care Clinic;   H.R. 4988, which designates the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 14 Walnut Street in Bordentown, New Jersey, as the Clara Barton Post Office Building;   H.R. 5023, which designates the Department of Veterans Affairs community-based outpatient clinic in Youngstown, Ohio, as the Carl Nunziato VA Clinic;   H.R. 5123, which designates the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 476 East Main Street in Galesburg, Illinois, as the Senior Airman Daniel Miller Post Office Building;   H.R. 5273, the “Securing America's Ports Act,” which requires the Department of Homeland Security to develop a plan for increasing to one hundred percent the rate of scanning of commercial and passenger vehicles and freight rail traffic entering the United States using large-scale non-intrusive inspection systems;   H.R. 5451, which designates the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 599 East Genesee Street in Fayetteville, New York, as the George H. Bacel Post Office Building;   H.R. 5458, the “Rocky Mountain National Park Boundary Modification Act,” which authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to acquire, by donation, an approximately 40-acre parcel of non-Federal land for inclusion within the boundary of the Rocky Mountain National Park in Colorado;   H.R. 5459, the “Rocky Mountain National Park Ownership Correction Act,” which authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to exchange a small parcel of Federal land for an equal sized parcel of private land to correct a land ownership error within the boundary of the Rocky Mountain National Park in Colorado;   H.R. 5597, which designates the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 305 Northwest 5th Street in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, as the Clara Luper Post Office Building;   H.R. 5663, the “Safeguarding Therapeutics Act,” which extends certain import refusal and destruction authorities to medical devices;   H.R. 5852, the “Weir Farm National Historical Park Redesignation Act,” which redesignates the Weir Farm National Historic Site in Connecticut as the Weir Farm National Historical Park;   H.R. 5972, which designates the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 500 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1, in Wilmington, Delaware, as the Mary Ann Shadd Cary Post Office;   H.R. 5983, which designates the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 4150 Chicago Avenue in Riverside, California, as the Woodie Rucker-Hughes Post Office Building;    H.R. 6016, which designates the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 14955 West Bell Road in Surprise, Arizona, as the Marc Lee Memorial Post Office Building;   H.R. 6100, the “Strengthening the Opposition to Female Genital Mutilation Act of 2020 or the STOP FGM Act of 2020,” which increases criminal penalties for performing a female genital mutilation on a minor and expands the scope of punishable offenses;   H.R. 6161, which designates the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 1585 Yanceyville Street, Greensboro, North Carolina, as the J. Howard Coble Post Office Building;   H.R. 6237, the “Proper and Reimbursed Care for Native Veterans Act” or the “PRC for Native Veterans Act,” which clarify the requirement of the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Department of Defense to reimburse the Indian Health Service for certain services;   H.R. 6418, which designates the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 509 Fairhope Avenue in Fairhope, Alabama, as the William "Jack" Jackson Edwards III Post Office Building;   H.R. 6535, which deems urban Indian organizations and their employees to be a part of the Public Health Service for purposes of liability protection under the Federal Tort Claims Act;   H.R. 7088, which designates the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 111 James Street in Reidsville, Georgia, as the Senator Jack Hill Post Office Building;   H.R. 7105, the “Johnny Isakson and David P. Roe, M.D. Veterans Health Care and Benefits Improvement Act of 2020,” which amends a number of VA authorities related to medical care; housing and homelessness; general benefits; education benefits; training programs; financial protections; addressing the particular needs of women veterans; military sexual trauma; memorials affairs; and extending the sunset dates of certain time-limited authorities;   H.R. 7259, the “Patents for Humanity Program Improvement Act,” which authorizes the holder of an acceleration certificate awarded under the Patents for Humanity program to transfer the certificate to another party;   H.R. 7347, which designates the medical center of the Department of Veterans Affairs in Ann Arbor, Michigan, as the Lieutenant Colonel Charles S. Kettles Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center;   H.R. 7460, the “Peace Corps Commemorative Work Extension Act,” which extends the authority of the Peace Corps Commemorative Foundation to establish a commemorative work on Federal lands in the District of Colombia to commemorate the mission of the Peace Corps and the ideals on which the Peace Corps was founded;   H.R. 7502, which designates the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 101 South 16th Street in Clarinda, Iowa, as the Jessie Field Shambaugh Post Office Building;   H.R. 7810, which designates the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 3519 East Walnut Street in Pearland, Texas, as the Tom Reid Post Office Building;   H.R. 7898, which establishes the National Landslide Hazards Reduction Program and the 3D Elevation Program within the Department of the Interior;   H.R. 8611, which designates the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 4755 Southeast Dixie Highway in Port Salerno, Florida, as the Joseph Bullock Post Office Building;   H.R. 8810, the “National Landslide Preparedness Act,” which establishes the National Landslide Hazards Reduction Program and the 3D Elevation Program within the Department of the Interior; and   H.R. 8906, the “Lifespan Respite Care Reauthorization Act of 2020,” which reauthorizes the Lifespan Respite Care Program through fiscal year (FY) 2024.     ###

Bill Announcement

 

Office of the Press Secretary FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE January 5, 2021 On Tuesday, January 5, 2021 the President signed into law:     H.R. 4356, the “Protecting Families of Fallen Servicemembers Act,” which expands Servicemembers Civil Relief Act protections to certain individuals for termination of contracts for telephone, multichannel video programming, or internet access service, and for other purposes;   H.R. 6192, the “1921 Silver Dollar Coin Anniversary Act,” which requires the Department of the Treasury to mint and issue coins in honor of the 100th anniversary of the completion of coinage of the Morgan dollar and the 100th anniversary of the commencement of coinage of the Peace dollar;   H.R. 6435, the “Combating Pandemic Scams Act of 2020,” which requires the Federal Trade Commission to develop and disseminate information to the public regarding scams related to the COVID-19 pandemic; and   H.R. 8354, the “Servicemembers and Veterans Initiative Act of 2020,” which establishes the Servicemembers and Veterans Initiative within the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department.

Message to the Congress on Addressing the Threat Posed By Applications and Other Software Developed or Controlled By Chinese Companie

 

Office of the Press Secretary FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE January 5, 2021 TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:     Pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, I hereby report that I have issued an Executive Order declaring additional steps to be taken concerning the national emergency with respect to the information and communications technology and services supply chain declared in Executive Order 13873 of May 15, 2019 (Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain) to deal with the threat posed by applications and other software developed or controlled by Chinese companies.     The pace and pervasiveness of the spread in the United States of certain connected mobile and desktop applications and other software developed or controlled by persons in the People's Republic of China (PRC), to include Hong Kong and Macau (China), continue to threaten the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.  By accessing personal electronic devices such as smartphones, tablets, and computers, Chinese connected software applications can access and capture vast swaths of information from users, including sensitive personally identifiable information and private information.  The continuing activity of the PRC and the Chinese Communist Party to steal or otherwise obtain United States persons' data makes clear that there is an intent to use bulk data collection to advance China's economic and national security agenda.  To deal with this threat, additional steps are required against those who develop or control certain Chinese connected software applications to protect our national security.     The Executive Order prohibits certain future transactions, as determined by the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary), involving the following Chinese connected software applications:  Alipay, CamScanner, QQ Wallet, SHAREit, Tencent QQ, VMate, WeChat Pay, and WPS Office.  The Secretary is also directed to:         (i)   continue to evaluate Chinese connected software applications that may pose an unacceptable risk to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, and to take appropriate action in accordance with Executive Order 13873; and         (ii)  in consultation with the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence, provide a report to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs with recommendations to prevent the sale or transfer of United States user data to, or access of such data by, foreign adversaries, including through the establishment of regulations and policies to identify, control, and license the export of such data.     I have delegated to the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, the authority to take such actions, including adopting appropriate rules and regulations, and employing all other powers granted to the President by IEEPA, as may be necessary to implement the Executive Order.  The heads of all executive departments and agencies are directed to take all appropriate measures within their authority to implement the provisions of the Executive Order.     I am enclosing a copy of the Executive Order I have issued.                         DONALD J. TRUMP THE WHITE HOUSE,     January 5, 2021.

Executive Order Addressing the Threat Posed By Applications and Other Software Developed or Controlled By Chinese Companies

 

Office of the Press Secretary FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE January 5, 2021 EXECUTIVE ORDER   - - - - - - -   ADDRESSING THE THREAT POSED BY APPLICATIONS AND OTHER SOFTWARE DEVELOPED OR CONTROLLED BY CHINESE COMPANIES        By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code,      I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, find that additional steps must be taken to deal with the national emergency with respect to the information and communications technology and services supply chain declared in Executive Order 13873 of May 15, 2019 (Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain).  Specifically, the pace and pervasiveness of the spread in the United States of certain connected mobile and desktop applications and other software developed or controlled by persons in the People's Republic of China, to include Hong Kong and Macau (China), continue to threaten the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.  At this time, action must be taken to address the threat posed by these Chinese connected software applications.      By accessing personal electronic devices such as smartphones, tablets, and computers, Chinese connected software applications can access and capture vast swaths of information from users, including sensitive personally identifiable information and private information.  This data collection threatens to provide the Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with access to Americans' personal and proprietary information -- which would permit China to track the locations of Federal employees and contractors, and build dossiers of personal information.      The continuing activity of the PRC and the CCP to steal or otherwise obtain United States persons' data makes clear that there is an intent to use bulk data collection to advance China's economic and national security agenda.  For example, the 2014 cyber intrusions of the Office of Personnel Management of security clearance records of more than 21 million people were orchestrated by Chinese agents.  In 2015, a Chinese hacking group breached the United States health insurance company Anthem, affecting more than 78 million Americans.  And the Department of Justice indicted members of the Chinese military for the 2017 Equifax cyber intrusion that compromised the personal information of almost half of all Americans.      In light of these risks, many executive departments and agencies (agencies) have prohibited the use of Chinese connected software applications and other dangerous software on Federal Government computers and mobile phones.  These prohibitions, however, are not enough given the nature of the threat from Chinese connected software applications.  In fact, the Government of India has banned the use of more than 200 Chinese connected software applications throughout the country; in a statement, India's Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology asserted that the applications were "stealing and surreptitiously transmitting users' data in an unauthorized manner to servers which have locations outside India."       The United States has assessed that a number of Chinese connected software applications automatically capture vast swaths of information from millions of users in the United States, including sensitive personally identifiable information and private information, which would allow the PRC and CCP access to Americans' personal and proprietary information.       The United States must take aggressive action against those who develop or control Chinese connected software applications to protect our national security.      Accordingly, I hereby order:      Section 1.  (a)  The following actions shall be prohibited beginning 45 days after the date of this order, to the extent permitted under applicable law:  any transaction by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, with persons that develop or control the following Chinese connected software applications, or with their subsidiaries, as those transactions and persons are identified by the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary) under subsection (e) of this section:  Alipay, CamScanner, QQ Wallet, SHAREit, Tencent QQ, VMate, WeChat Pay, and WPS Office.      (b)  The Secretary is directed to continue to evaluate Chinese connected software applications that may pose an unacceptable risk to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, and to take appropriate action in accordance with Executive Order 13873.      (c)  Not later than 45 days after the date of this order, the Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence, shall provide a report to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs with recommendations to prevent the sale or transfer of United States user data to, or access of such data by, foreign adversaries, including through the establishment of regulations and policies to identify, control, and license the export of such data.      (d)  The prohibitions in subsection (a) of this section apply except to the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted before the date of this order.      (e)  Not earlier than 45 days after the date of this order, the Secretary shall identify the transactions and persons that develop or control the Chinese connected software applications subject to subsection (a) of this section.      Sec. 2.  (a)  Any transaction by a United States person or within the United States that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate the prohibition set forth in this order is prohibited.      (b)  Any conspiracy formed to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.      Sec. 3.  For the purposes of this order:      (a)  the term "connected software application" means software, a software program, or group of software programs, designed to be used by an end user on an end-point computing device and designed to collect, process, or transmit data via the Internet as an integral part of its functionality.      (b)  the term "entity" means a government or instrumentality of such government, partnership, association, trust, joint venture, corporation, group, subgroup, or other organization, including an international organization;      (c)  the term "person" means an individual or entity;      (d)  the term "personally identifiable information" (PII) is information that, when used alone or with other relevant data, can identify an individual.  PII may contain direct identifiers (e.g., passport information) that can identify a person uniquely, or quasi-identifiers (e.g., race) that can be combined with other quasi-identifiers (e.g., date of birth) to successfully recognize an individual.      (e)  the term "United States person" means any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United States.      Sec. 4.  (a)  The Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, is hereby authorized to take such actions, including adopting rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to me by IEEPA, as may be necessary to implement this order.  All agencies shall take all appropriate measures within their authority to implement this order.      (b)  The heads of agencies shall provide, in their discretion and to the extent permitted by law, such resources, information, and assistance to the Department of Commerce as required to implement this order, including the assignment of staff to the Department of Commerce to perform the duties described in this order.      Sec. 5.  Severability.  If any provision of this order, or the application of any provision to any person or circumstance, is held to be invalid, the remainder of this order and the application of its other provisions to any other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.      Sec. 6.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:           (i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department, agency, or the head thereof; or           (ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.      (b)  This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.      (c)  This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.                                DONALD J. TRUMP   THE WHITE HOUSE,     January 5, 2021.