Statement from the Press Secretary Regarding Small Modular Reactors for National Defense and Space Exploration

 

Office of the Press Secretary FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE January 12, 2021 Statement from the Press Secretary Regarding Small Modular Reactors for National Defense and Space Exploration Today, President Trump is issuing an Executive Order on Promoting Small Modular Reactors for National Defense and Space Exploration, which will further revitalize the United States nuclear energy sector, reinvigorate America's space exploration program, and produce diverse energy options for national defense needs.  The United States has used transportable nuclear reactors for nearly 70 years for functions like propelling aircraft carriers through the sea and enabling submarines to stay underwater for long periods of time.  Using small modular reactors for national defense and space exploration will allow the United States to maintain and advance our leadership and dominance across space and terrestrial domains.  Small modular reactors have the potential to enhance energy flexibility and energy security at domestic military installations in remote locations.  At President Trump’s direction, the Department of Defense will establish and implement a plan to demonstrate the energy flexibility and cost effectiveness of a small modular reactor at a domestic military installation, and will pilot a transportable small modular reactor for a mission other than naval propulsion for the first time in half a century.   Nuclear power sources are essential to deep space exploration, where solar power is not practical.  The sustainable exploration of the Moon, Mars, and other locations will be enhanced by small modular reactors deployed from Earth for operations across the solar system.  NASA will explore the use of nuclear energy systems for human and robotic exploration missions through 2040.  As the United States develops new technology, we will continue to adhere to the highest standards for nuclear nonproliferation and safety. President Trump is committed to ensuring the safety and prosperity of the American people and industry.  This Order advances that commitment through continued United States leadership in research and technology, innovation, energy development, and advanced technology.

Executive Order on Promoting Small Modular Reactors for National Defense and Space Exploration

 

Office of the Press Secretary FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE January 12, 2021 EXECUTIVE ORDER   - - - - - - -   PROMOTING SMALL MODULAR REACTORS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SPACE EXPLORATION          By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:       Section 1.  Purpose.  Nuclear energy is critical to United States national security.  That is why I have taken a series of actions to promote its development and facilitate its use.  On June 29, 2017, I announced an initiative to revive and expand the nuclear energy sector and directed a complete review of United States nuclear energy policy to help find new ways to revitalize this crucial energy resource.  On July 12, 2019, I signed a Presidential Memorandum entitled "The Effect of Uranium Imports on the National Security and Establishment of the United States Nuclear Fuel Working Group," with the goal of examining the current state of domestic nuclear fuel production and reinvigorating the nuclear fuel supply chain, consistent with United States national security and nonproliferation goals.  On August 20, 2019, I signed National Security Presidential Memorandum-20, entitled "Launch of Spacecraft Containing Space Nuclear Systems," calling for development and use of space nuclear systems to enable or enhance space exploration and operational capabilities.        The purpose of this order is to take an important additional step to revitalize the United States nuclear energy sector, reinvigorate America's space exploration program, and develop diverse energy options for national defense needs.  Under this action, the United States Government will coordinate its nuclear activities to apply the benefits of nuclear energy most effectively toward American technology supremacy, including the use of small modular reactors for national defense and space exploration.  This work is critical to advancing my Administration's priorities for the United States to lead in research, technology, invention, innovation, and advanced technology development; its mission to promote and protect the United States national security innovation base; its drive to secure energy dominance; and its commitment to achieving all of these goals in a manner consistent with the highest nuclear nonproliferation standards.       The United States was the first nation to invent and develop the technology to harness nuclear energy.  Since the 1950s, the United States Navy has been operating and advancing transportable nuclear reactors, resulting in powerfully enhanced marine propulsion for its aircraft carriers and allowing nuclear-powered submarines to remain submerged for extended periods of time.        The United States must sustain its ability to meet the energy requirements for its national defense and space exploration initiatives.  The ability to use small modular reactors will help maintain and advance United States dominance and strategic leadership across the space and terrestrial domains.      Sec. 2.  Policy.  It is the policy of the United States to promote advanced reactor technologies, including small modular reactors, to support defense installation energy flexibility and energy security, and for use in space exploration, guided by the following principles:       (a)  A healthy and robust nuclear energy industry is critical to the national security, energy security, and economic prosperity of the United States;        (b)  The United States should maintain technology supremacy for nuclear research and development, manufacturing proficiency, and security and safety; and      (c)  The United States Government should bolster national defense and space exploration capabilities and enable private-sector innovation of advanced reactor technologies.        Sec. 3.  Demonstration of Commercial Reactors to Enhance Energy Flexibility at a Defense Installation.  (a)  Micro-reactors have the potential to enhance energy flexibility and energy security at domestic military installations in remote locations.  Accordingly, the Secretary of Defense shall, within 180 days of the date of this order, establish and implement a plan to demonstrate the energy flexibility capability and cost effectiveness of a Nuclear Regulatory Commission-licensed micro‑reactor at a domestic military installation.       (b)  If the demonstration is successful, the Secretary of Defense shall identify opportunities at domestic military installations where this capability could enhance or supplement the fulfillment of installation energy requirements.  In identifying these opportunities, the Secretary of Defense shall take into account considerations that are unique to national defense needs and requirements that may not be relevant in the private sector, such as:             (i)    the ability to provide resilient, independent energy delivery to installations in the event that connections to an electrical grid are compromised;           (ii)   the ability to operate for an extended period of time without refueling;           (iii)  system resistance to disruption from an electro‑magnetic pulse event; and           (iv)   system cybersecurity requirements.      Sec. 4.  Defense Capabilities.  (a)  The Department of Defense is one of the largest consumers of energy in the world, using more than 10 million gallons of fuel per day and 30,000 gigawatt-hours of electricity per year, nearly all of which is provided through civilian electrical grids.  Fuel demands for a modern United States military have dramatically grown since World War II and are anticipated to continue to increase in order to support high-energy-usage military systems.  In this context, nuclear power could significantly enhance national defense power capabilities.        (b)  The Secretary of Defense shall, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Energy, and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA Administrator):              (i)    determine whether advanced nuclear reactors can be made to benefit Department of Defense future space power needs;             (ii)   pilot a transportable micro-reactor prototype;             (iii)  direct an analysis of alternatives for personnel, regulatory, and technical requirements to inform future decisions with respect to nuclear power usage; and             (iv)   direct an analysis of United States military uses for space nuclear power and propulsion technologies and an analysis of foreign adversaries' space power and propulsion programs.        Sec. 5.  Space Exploration.  (a)  Nuclear power sources that use uranium fuel or plutonium heat sources are essential to deep space exploration and in areas where solar power is not practical.  NASA uses radioisotope power systems, such as radioisotope thermoelectric generators and radioisotope heater units, to provide power and heat for deep space robotic missions.  Nuclear power sources in the kilowatt range may be needed for demonstrating In-situ Resource Utilization (ISRU) and robotic exploration of permanently shadowed craters on the Moon that contain frozen water.  Nuclear reactors up to 100 kilowatts may be needed to support human habitats, ISRU, other facilities, and rovers on both the Moon and Mars.  Power sources in the megawatt range would be necessary for efficient, long‑duration deep space propulsion.  Affordable, lightweight nuclear power sources in space would enable new opportunities for scientific discovery.  The sustainable exploration of the Moon, Mars, and other locations will be enhanced if small modular reactors can be deployed and operated remotely from Earth.       (b)  Within 180 days of the date of this order, the NASA Administrator, in consultation with heads of other executive departments and agencies (agencies), as appropriate, shall define requirements for NASA utilization of nuclear energy systems for human and robotic exploration missions through 2040 and analyze the costs and benefits of such requirements.  In defining these requirements, the NASA Administrator shall take into account considerations unique to the utilization of nuclear energy systems in space, such as:             (i) transportability of a reactor prior to and after deployment;           (ii) thermal management in a reduced- or zero-gravity environment in a vacuum or near-vacuum;           (iii) fluid transfer within reactor systems in a reduced or zero-gravity environment;             (iv)    reactor size and mass that can be launched from Earth and assembled in space;             (v)     cooling of nuclear reactors in space;             (vi) electric power requirements;             (vii)   space safety rating to enable operations as part of human space exploration missions;              (viii)  period of time for which a reactor can operate without refueling; and             (ix)    conditioning of reactor components for use in the space environment.        Sec. 6.  Domestic Fuel Supply.  (a)  A thriving and secure domestic nuclear fuel supply chain is critical to the national interests of the United States.  A viable domestic nuclear fuel supply chain not only supports defense and national security activities, but also enables the success of the commercial nuclear industry.  Many advanced reactor concepts, however, will require high-assay, low-enriched uranium (HALEU), for which no domestic commercial enrichment capability currently exists.  The United States must take steps to ensure a viable United States-origin HALEU supply.        (b)  The Secretary of Energy shall complete the Department of Energy's ongoing 3-year, $115 million demonstration of a United States-origin enrichment technology capable of producing HALEU for use in defense-related advanced reactor applications.  Within funding available for the demonstration project, the Secretary of Energy should develop a plan to promote successful transition of this technology to the private sector for commercial adoption.      (c)  The Secretary of Energy shall consult with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the NASA Administrator regarding how advanced fuels and related technologies can best support implementation of sections 3, 4, and 5 of this order.       Sec. 7.  Common Technology Roadmap.  (a)  The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Energy, and the NASA Administrator shall develop a common technology roadmap through 2030 that describes potential development programs and that coordinates, to the extent practicable, terrestrial-based advanced nuclear reactor and space-based nuclear power and propulsion efforts.  Agencies shall remain responsible for funding their respective mission-unique requirements.  The roadmap shall also include, at a minimum:            (i) assessments of foreign nations' space nuclear power and propulsion technological capabilities;             (ii)   pathways for transitioning technologies developed through Federally supported programs to private-sector activities; and              (iii)  other applications supporting the goals provided in section 1 of this order.         (b)  The roadmap shall be submitted to the President by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, and the Executive Secretary of the National Space Council before submissions of budget proposals by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Energy, and the NASA Administrator.      Sec. 8.  Definitions.  For purposes of this order:       (a)  The term "small modular reactor" refers to an advanced nuclear reactor of electric generation capacity less than 300 megawatt-electric.  Because of the smaller size, small modular reactors can generally be designed for factory fabrication and modular construction to take advantage of economies of serial production and shorter construction times.       (b)  The term "micro-reactor" refers to a nuclear reactor of electric generation capacity less than 10 megawatt-electric that can be deployed remotely.  Micro-reactors are a subset of small modular reactors and are also known as "very small modular reactors."       (c)  The term "transportable micro-reactor" refers to a micro-reactor that can be moved by truck, ship, or large military transport aircraft and is capable of both rapid deployment and teardown or removal, typically with safe teardown or removal less than 1 week after 1 year of full-power operation.       (d)  The term "space exploration" refers to in-space scientific and resource exploration, in-space economic and industrial development, and development of associated in-space logistical infrastructure.       (e)  The term "national defense" refers to the protection of the United States and its interests from foreign attack or other natural danger, including phenomena occurring on Earth and in space.         Sec. 9.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:              (i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or             (ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.      (b)  This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.      (c)  This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.                              DONALD J. TRUMP THE WHITE HOUSE,     January 5, 2021.

Statement from the President

 

Office of the Press Secretary FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE January 12, 2021 Statement from the President Melania and I mourn the passing of Sheldon Adelson, and send our heartfelt condolences to his wife Miriam, his children and grandchildren. Sheldon lived the true American dream. His ingenuity, genius, and creativity earned him immense wealth, but his character and philanthropic generosity his great name. Sheldon was also a staunch supporter of our great ally the State of Israel. He tirelessly advocated for the relocation of the United States embassy to Jerusalem, the recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, and the pursuit of peace between Israel and its neighbors. Sheldon was true to his family, his country, and all those that knew him. The world has lost a great man. He will be missed.

President Donald J. Trump Approves District of Columbia Emergency Declaration

 

Office of the Press Secretary FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE January 11, 2021

President Donald J. Trump Approves District of Columbia Emergency Declaration                                                                                                                                                             Today, President Donald J. Trump declared that an emergency exists in the District of Columbia and ordered Federal assistance to supplement the District’s response efforts due to the emergency conditions resulting from the 59th Presidential Inauguration from January 11 to January 24, 2021.   The President’s action authorizes the Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), to coordinate all disaster relief efforts which have the purpose of alleviating the hardship and suffering caused by the emergency on the local population, and to provide appropriate assistance for required emergency measures, authorized under Title V of the Stafford Act, to save lives and to protect property and public health and safety, and to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in the District of Columbia.   Specifically, FEMA is authorized to identify, mobilize, and provide at its discretion, equipment and resources necessary to alleviate the impacts of the emergency.  Emergency protective measures, limited to direct Federal assistance, will be provided at 100 percent Federal funding.    Pete Gaynor, Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Department of Homeland Security, named Thomas J. Fargione as the Federal Coordinating Officer for Federal recovery operations in the affected area.    FOR FURTHER INFORMATION MEDIA SHOULD CONTACT THE FEMA NEWS DESK AT (202) 646-3272 OR FEMA-NEWS-DESK@FEMA.DHS.GOV.

Proclamation on Honoring United States Capitol Police Officers

 

Office of the Press Secretary FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE January 10, 2021

HONORING UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE OFFICERS   - - - - - - -   BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA   A PROCLAMATION          As a sign of respect for the service and sacrifice of United States Capitol Police Officers Brian D. Sicknick and Howard Liebengood, and all Capitol Police Officers and law enforcement across this great Nation, by the authority vested in me as President of the United States by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, I hereby order that the flag of the United States shall be flown at half-staff at the White House and upon all public buildings and grounds, at all military posts and naval stations, and on all naval vessels of the Federal Government in the District of Columbia and throughout the United States and its Territories and possessions until sunset, January 13, 2021.  I also direct that the flag shall be flown at half-staff for the same length of time at all United States embassies, legations, consular offices, and other facilities abroad, including all military facilities and naval vessels and stations.      IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this tenth day of January, in the year of our Lord two thousand twenty-one, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and forty-fifth.                                 DONALD J. TRUMP

Executive Order on Providing an Order of Succession Within the Environmental Protection Agency

 

Office of the Press Secretary FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE January 8, 2021 EXECUTIVE ORDER - - - - - - - PROVIDING AN ORDER OF SUCCESSION WITHIN  THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY        By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, as amended, 5 U.S.C. 3345 et seq. (the "Act"), it is hereby ordered as follows:     Section 1.  Order of Succession.  Subject to the provisions of section 2 of this order, and to the limitations set forth in the Act, the following officials of the Environmental Protection Agency, in the order listed, shall act as and perform the functions and duties of the office of the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (Administrator) during any period in which the Administrator and the Deputy Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency have died, resigned, or otherwise become unable to perform the functions and duties of the office of Administrator:       (a)  General Counsel;     (b)  Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste (also known as the Assistant Administrator for the Office of Land and Emergency Management);     (c)  Assistant Administrator for Toxic Substances (also known as the Assistant Administrator for the Office of Chemical Safety and Pollution Prevention);     (d)  Assistant Administrator for the Office of Air and Radiation;     (e)  Assistant Administrator for the Office of Water;     (f)  Assistant Administrator for the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance;     (g)  Chief Financial Officer;     (h)  Assistant Administrator for the Office of Research and Development;      (i)  Assistant Administrator for the Office of International and Tribal Affairs;     (j)  Assistant Administrator for the Office of Mission Support;      (k)  Associate Deputy Administrator for Programs;     (l)  Associate Deputy Administrator;     (m)  Regional Administrator, Region VIII;     (n)  Principal Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Office of Mission Support;     (o)  Deputy Regional Administrator, Region VIII;     (p)  Principal Deputy General Counsel; and     (q)  Principal Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance.      Sec. 2.  Exceptions.  (a)  No individual who is serving in an office listed in section 1(a)-(q) of this order in an acting capacity shall, by virtue of so serving, act as Administrator pursuant to this order.     (b)  No individual listed in section 1(a)-(q) of this order shall act as Administrator unless that individual is otherwise eligible to so serve under the Act.     (c)  Notwithstanding the provisions of this order, the President retains discretion, to the extent permitted by law, to depart from this order in designating an acting Administrator.      Sec. 3.  Revocation.  Executive Order 13763 of January 13, 2017 (Providing an Order of Succession Within the Environmental Protection Agency), is hereby revoked.      Sec. 4.  General Provision.  This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.                          DONALD J. TRUMP   THE WHITE HOUSE,     January 8, 2021.

Memorandum on Providing an Order of Succession Within the United States International Development Finance Corporation

 

Office of the Press Secretary FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE January 8, 2021

January 8, 2021       MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE UNITED STATES                  INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION   SUBJECT:       Providing an Order of Succession Within the                United States International Development                Finance Corporation   By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, as amended, 5 U.S.C. 3345 et seq. (the "Act"), I hereby direct the following:        Section 1.  Order of Succession.  Subject to the provisions of section 2 of this memorandum, and to the limitations set forth in the Act, the following officers of the United States International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), in the order listed, shall act as and perform the functions and duties of the office of the Chief Executive Officer of DFC during any period in which the Chief Executive Officer of DFC has died, resigned, or otherwise become unable to perform the functions and duties of the office of the Chief Executive Officer of DFC:        (a)  Deputy Chief Executive Officer;        (b)  Chief Operating Officer;        (c)  Executive Vice President for Strategy;        (d)  Chief of Staff;        (e)  Vice President and General Counsel;        (f)  Deputy General Counsel;        (g)  Vice President, Structured Finance and Insurance;        (h)  Vice President, Development Credit; and        (i)  Chief Financial Officer and Vice President, Finance.        Sec. 2.  Exceptions.  (a)  No individual who is serving in an office listed in section 1 of this memorandum in an acting capacity shall, by virtue of so serving, act as Chief Executive Officer of DFC pursuant to this memorandum.        (b)  No individual who is serving in an office listed in section 1 of this memorandum shall act as Chief Executive Officer of DFC unless that individual is otherwise eligible to so serve under the Act.        (c)  Notwithstanding the provisions of this memorandum, the President retains discretion, to the extent permitted by law, to depart from this memorandum in designating an acting Chief Executive Officer of DFC.        Sec. 3.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this memorandum shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:             (i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or             (ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.        (b)  This memorandum shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.        (c)  This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.        Sec. 4.  You are authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the Federal Register.                                      DONALD J. TRUMP

Three Nominations and One Withdrawal Sent to the Senate

 

Office of the Press Secretary FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE January 7, 2021

NOMINATIONS SENT TO THE SENATE:      Jason Abend, of Virginia, to be Inspector General, Department of Defense, vice Jon T. Rymer, resigned.      William Patrick Joseph Kimmitt, of Virginia, to be a Member of the United States International Trade Commission for a term expiring June 16, 2029, vice F. Scott Kieff, term expired.      Barbera Hale Thornhill, of California, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Republic of Singapore. WITHDRAWAL SENT TO THE SENATE:      Chad F. Wolf, of Virginia, to be Secretary of Homeland Security, vice Kirstjen Nielsen, resigned, which was sent to the Senate on January 3, 2021.

REMARKS BY PRESS SECRETARY KAYLEIGH MCENANY James S. Brady Press Briefing Room

 

Office of the Press Secretary FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE January 7, 2021

REMARKS BY PRESS SECRETARY KAYLEIGH MCENANY   James S. Brady Press Briefing Room     5:18 P.M. EST        MS. MCENANY:  I am here to deliver this message on behalf of the entire White House.  Let me be clear: The violence we saw yesterday at our nation's Capitol was appalling, reprehensible, and antithetical to the American way.  We condemn it -- the President and this administration -- in the strongest possible terms.  It is unacceptable, and those that broke the law should be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.        I stood here at this podium the day after a historic church burned amid violent riots, and I said this: “The First Amendment guarantees the right of the people to peaceably assemble.  What we saw last night in Washington and across the country was not that.”  End quote.  Make no mistake: What we saw yesterday afternoon in the halls of our Capitol, likewise, was not that.        We grieve for the loss of life and those injured, and we hold them in our prayers and close to our hearts at this time.  We thank our valiant law enforcement officers who are true American heroes.        What we saw yesterday was a group of violent rioters undermining the legitimate First Amendment rights of the many thousands who came to peacefully have their voices heard in our nation's capital.  Those who violently besieged our Capitol are the opposite of everything this administration stands for.  The core value of our administration is the idea that all citizens have the right to live in safety, peace, and freedom.         Those who are working in this building are working to ensure an orderly transition of power.  Now it is time for America to unite, to come together to reject the violence that we have seen.  We are one American people under God.        Thank you very much.                                        END           5:20 P.M. EST

Statement from the Press Secretary

 

Office of the Press Secretary FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE January 5, 2021

Statement from the Press Secretary  Antifa activists have brutally attacked our law-abiding friends, neighbors, and business owners, and destroyed historic landmarks that our communities have cherished for decades.  This violence and lawlessness has no place in the United States and will be called out for the domestic terrorism that it is.  Today, President Donald J. Trump signed a memorandum to ensure that Federal officials assess actions of Antifa activists in light of Federal laws that restrict the entry of aliens associated with terrorist organizations and aliens intent on criminal activity.  President Trump will not allow Antifa, or any terrorist organization, to destroy our great country.

Memorandum on Inadmissibility of Persons Affiliated with Antifa Based on Organized Criminal Activity

 

Office of the Press Secretary FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE January 5, 2021

January 5, 2021         MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE                THE ATTORNEY GENERAL                THE SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY   SUBJECT:       Inadmissibility of Persons Affiliated with Antifa Based on Organized Criminal Activity    By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:        Section 1.  Purpose.  One of the fundamental purposes of our Government is to ensure the safety of our citizens.  Consistent with the purpose of creating peaceful and prosperous communities, Federal law ensures immigration benefits may be granted only to those individuals who will follow the laws that govern all United States citizens.  Accordingly, section 212(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3), renders inadmissible aliens who have engaged or who are likely to engage in terrorist activity and those aliens who seek entry into the United States to engage, principally or incidentally, in unlawful activity.  Active membership in a criminal association is relevant to the determination of whether an applicant for a visa or other immigration benefit is seeking to enter the United States to engage in unlawful activity.  Accordingly, law enforcement organizations, including the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security, should continue to provide the Department of State with current information appropriate for updating the list of criminal organizations in the Foreign Affairs Manual at 9 FAM 302.5-4(B)(2).  This information should include assessments of whether aliens involved with such associations pose a threat to the safety of our communities.        In particular, reliable reporting suggests that the movement known as Antifa is directly or indirectly responsible for some of the recent lawlessness in our communities, and has exploited tragedies to advance a radical, leftist, anarchist, and often violent agenda.  In fact, Antifa has long used otherwise permissible demonstrations to engage in lawless, criminal behavior to further its radical agenda.         Between February and August 2017, during a series of protests in Berkeley, California, Antifa protesters physically assaulted several individuals and caused significant property damage.  Specifically, reports indicate that during the August 27, 2017, protest, black-clad Antifa protestors viciously attacked a rally, including targeting at least one person because of his conservative political beliefs.  These protests resulted in 13 arrests on a range of charges, including assault with a deadly weapon and obstructing a police officer.  During the demonstrations on February 1, 2017, 150 black-clad agitators contributed to an estimated $100,000 worth of property damage in Berkeley.  Separately, on June 29, 2019, individuals affiliated with Antifa physically attacked conservative journalist Andy Ngo while he was covering demonstrations in Portland, Oregon, leaving him hospitalized.         Those affiliated with Antifa have also repeatedly threatened violence, including against law enforcement officers.  For instance, in June 2018, a Twitter account linked to Antifa shared the names of more than 1,500 Immigration and Customs Enforcement employees, leading others to track and publicly post some employees' social media profiles, phone numbers, and home addresses, which, as intended, resulted in the employees being harassed.        In late September of 2020, individuals in a moving truck distributed riot equipment -- including shields, masks, and a sign emblazoned with an Antifa symbol -- in Louisville, Kentucky, before riots ensued there.  Hours later, the violent situation resulted in the shooting of two police officers.  And on October 5, 2020, reported Antifa activists in Portland were captured on video attacking a woman carrying an American flag.        The Department of Justice has already publicly confirmed that actions by Antifa and similar groups meet the standard for domestic terrorism.         The violence spurred on by Antifa -- such as hurling projectiles and incendiary devices at police, burning vehicles, and violently confronting police in defiance of local curfews -- is dangerous to human life and to the fabric of our Nation.  These violent acts undermine the rights of peaceful protestors and destroy the lives, liberty, and property of the people of this Nation, especially those most vulnerable.       Sec. 2.  Inadmissibility of Antifa Associates Based on Terrorist and Unlawful Activity.  (a)  The Secretary of State shall, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security, review information received from the Department of Justice and other authorities to assess whether to classify Antifa as a terrorist organization under section 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi) of title 8, United States Code.        (b)  The Secretary of State shall take all appropriate steps, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security, to consider listing Antifa in 9 FAM 302.5-4(B)(2)(U) Aliens Who Are Members of an Identified Criminal Organization.        Sec. 3.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this memorandum shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:             (i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or             (ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.        (b)  This memorandum shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.        (c)  This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.                                      DONALD J. TRUMP

BACKGROUND PRESS CALL BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS ON AN EXECUTIVE ORDER TO ADDRESS THREATS POSED BY APPLICATIONS AND SOFTWARE DEVELOPED BY CHINESE COMPANIES

 

Office of the Press Secretary FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE January 5, 2021 BACKGROUND PRESS CALL BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS ON AN EXECUTIVE ORDER TO ADDRESS THREATS POSED BY APPLICATIONS AND SOFTWARE DEVELOPED BY CHINESE COMPANIES   Via Teleconference     6:36 P.M. EST        SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Good evening, everyone, and thanks for joining the call with short notice.  I really appreciate it.  You’ve probably seen the EO already, and so tonight we’ve got two officials from the NSC on to talk about the EO that was signed on the threats posed by software developed or controlled by Chinese companies.        This call is on background, which means that quotes used from officials on this call must be attributed to a “senior administration official” or “senior administration officials.”        Having said that, I’ll introduce who’s on the call, just for your reference.  We will have brief comments at the top and then open things up to Q&A.        The participants for the call are [senior administration officials].        So, with that, we will get started, and I’ll turn it over to [senior administration official] first, and we anticipate just having [senior administration official] give comments, and then we will have questions after that, respecting everyone’s time.        Thank you very much.        SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Thanks so much for joining us.  And as [senior administration official] said, I’m [senior administration official] here at the National Security Council.        So, assuming that folks have seen or are looking at the EO, we’ll kind of keep it brief upfront, and then we’ll open it up to some questions.  So, just in a couple of minutes, we want to make it clear -- and I think the executive order that you’re looking at makes it clear -- that the President has no higher priority than the safety and security of the American people.         This executive order addresses a continuing and, really, a growing, over the last years, threat that’s posed by the Chinese Communist Party and, in this particular case, through Chinese software applications.        By accessing our personal electronic devices, such as smartphones, tablets, even computers, connected software applicants can and often do access and capture vast amounts of information from the users of those devices.  Oftentimes that can be, as we all know, sensitive personally identifiable information or just sort of private or privileged information.        We understand that this could provide the government of the PRC and really, frankly, the Chinese Communist Party with access to information that they can then exploit against the United States -- either our government or individuals or businesses and other entities here in America.        I think we’re all aware that Beijing requires, really, all commercial companies, no matter how large or small, to support the Chinese Communist Party’s political objectives.  We’ve seen recently from Chinese regulators that they’ve demonstrated just this -- in the case of news, for example, about Alibaba or even the Ant Group.  And there are other examples, obviously, cropping up really almost every week.        So I think everyone is also aware that the CCP -- the Chinese Communist Party’s mil-civ fusion strategy explicitly aims to either co-opt or, in cases, even coerce civilian enterprises into assisting with modernization and development of the People’s Liberation Army.  We don’t think necessarily that, you know, Americans’ sensitive information and data, either from companies or individuals, should be contributing to that cause.        This executive order tasks the Secretary of Commerce to identify prohibited transactions involving eight named Chinese software applications.  Three of those eight are actually payment services, as you probably noticed.  And this tasking to the Secretary of Commerce is generally similar to what was passed in the two August executive orders that implicated WeChat and TikTok.        This executive order today, though, that the President signed also does two other things.  It directs the Secretary to identify and take appropriate actions against other software applications -- so, beyond the 8 -- and now, really, 10 that have been named -- and to take, you know -- as we said, take appropriate action to get those; and also to make recommendations on how the United States should develop a program to control the export of U.S. personal identifiable or U.S. user data, generally in the bulk form, to foreign adversaries.             So, again, you know, this administration and the President has for the last four years and will continue to prioritize the safety and security of the U.S. homeland and the American people.        And with that, we’ll open it up to some questions.        SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  So, actually, before we open it up, actually -- so, once again, we’ve got [senior administration official] here, as well as [senior administration official].  But thank you for that.        So, Operator, we will now open it up for a few questions.  The Operator is going to identify your line number, so you will know what line is opened up.  And then if you could please identify yourself and your outlet before asking your question, and then it’ll go on mute at that point.        So we’ll take as many questions as we can, respecting everyone’s time.  Go ahead with questions please, Operator.        Q    Thank you.  This is Steven Overly from Politico.  I wanted to ask a question.  The executive order that -- or the two executive orders from August targeting WeChat and TikTok were heard by the courts and have been temporarily paused.  I wondered if you might comment on whether this executive order could see a similar fate in the courts or whether you’re pursuing things differently this time.  Thank you.        SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Hey, Steven.  That’s a great question.  So, we continue to believe that those two executive orders are obviously valid and should be implemented, and we continue to fight that battle, if you will, in the courts.  And, obviously, we sincerely hope and expect to win that.        And so that doesn’t prejudice our decisions going forward or that our opinion on how that should turn out does, you know, influence what we’re doing in the sense that we’re going to continue to take the right action.        I will say that those injunctions -- and I would defer you to DOJ for confirmation, but our belief is that those injunctions -- and this is public information -- are being blocked under a First Amendment clause within IEEPA, and they are probably more closely tied to social media applications in that sense.  And that particular case would probably not be easily brought against some of these other applications that we’ve named today.        Q    Alex Alper with Reuters.  I just wanted to ask about the types of transactions that you envision the Commerce Department blocking.  Would this include, you know, payment to employees?  Or would it really just be about the companies that, like, host the apps on phones?  Would it be the users?  Who do you see as affected by it, and what sorts of transactions would you like to see banned?        SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Hey, Alex.  So I think the best expectations that we would have -- at least, you know, right now, before final decisions are made -- is that it would look a lot like what you saw the Commerce regulatory framework that was published to implement those August 6th executive orders on TikTok and WeChat.        And so, you know, to answer the specific question: No, it would not target employees.  We do not expect that at this time.         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Thank you, Operator.  And thanks, Alex.  Operator, we’ll go ahead and take the next question please.        Q    Hey, guys.  This is Justin Sink at Bloomberg.  I was wondering if you could talk about the 45-day timeline on the executive order.  Obviously, that pushes things into the next administration.  And without getting sidetracked on that, I’m wondering if there’s any expectation that you could accelerate that at all, or if not, how or if you expect the incoming administration to, sort of, handle this now that you guys have set it out.        SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Hey, thanks for that question.  So there was really no consideration given to, you know, attempt to accelerate on anything.  We think 45 days is the appropriate timeline for implementation, just as you saw with the August EOs.  And, really, the question of if and when anything would change would probably be appropriate for that next administration.        SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Thank you, Operator.  We’ll go ahead and take the next question.        Q    Hi, there.  This is Owen Churchill with the South China Morning Post.  Thanks a lot for the briefing.  I just have a couple of very quick questions.  The first: I’m wondering if you could elaborate on how you came to focus in on these particular eight companies, whether you have any kind of specific evidence of U.S. -- individual states that are being used for, you know, the kind of malignant purposes that you outlined at the top.        And then, secondly, I just wanted to follow up on a prior question.  Would this cover individual transactions?  For example, a user of WeChat Pay just sending money to another contact through the app.  Would that be covered under this?  Thank you.        SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  So, on the first question, the software applications that were chosen were largely chosen based on risk.  We cannot get into whether and what type of information we may or may not have regarding specific applications, you know, that -- and what other nefarious or otherwise activity is being done by some of these companies.  But what the executive order is based on is it’s based on risk.         And so I think what you’ll find, if you look up some of these apps, is they all have extremely high numbers of users/download.  And that means to us that they are found on extremely large numbers.  You know, we’re talking tens of millions of devices.  And, you know, the mass collection of information and data going into, you know, PRC, whatever government department, AI algorithms, or what have you -- the potential for that is what we’re talking about: the risk.         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Operator, we’ll go ahead and take the next question.        Q    Hi, it’s Stephanie Dhue with CNBC.  Thanks for the call.  So, what information changed to cause the administration to do this now versus earlier in the process?  What informed your timing?        SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  So, I can tell you that a lot -- like, a lot of the actions that this administration has embarked on in our, you know, general strategic competition with China are probably late.  But better late than never in the sense that, you know, maybe late that they should’ve been done, you know, in a prior -- years ago.         And so we’re -- we’ve had a lot of catching up to do.  And I think if you look at the record that we’ve been actually quite busy.  And so I wouldn’t say the timing is any particular -- I wouldn’t try to tie it to, you know, the end of -- or potential end of an administration or anything like that.  I think we just need to look at the overall threat to the American people, and, you know, that we’re going to take some actions to counter that threat.        SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Operator, we’ll go ahead and take three more questions.        Q    Hi, Bobby Allyn here with NPR.  Thanks for taking my question.  So, as it’s been noted, you know, the previous EO back in August targeting WeChat -- with that halted in the Court, I’m why there is another -- you know, another attempt here to go after WeChat and not ByteDance, which is TikTok’s owner, because ByteDance has been making moves in the e-payment world, and there’s been talk of TikTok even developing some kind of e-payment service.  So I’m wondering why ByteDance wasn’t among the Chinese companies listed in this EO.        SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  So, thank you for your question.  It’s a great question.  One of the items that obviously we’re looking at, and one of the pieces that is in this executive order, is for the Secretary of Commerce to continue to review and assess applications related -- and related companies that would be appropriate for further action.         So, that -- this is an evolutionary process as we continue to assess a wide range of risks to national security and take appropriate action as we work through these different issues.         SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Great.  Two more -- two more questions, Operator.        Q    Hi, this is Brett Fortnam with Inside U.S. Trade.  In terms of the transition, have you communicated with the Biden team about this order and this -- actually, since that 45-day timeline is going to go past January 20th?  Has there been any question on how that order will be carried out?        SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  The potential transition activity with the possible incoming Biden administration does not involve -- that is just potential transition-related activity through GSA, and it does not cover this EO.         Operator, we’ll go ahead and take one last question.        Q    Hi, Dave Perera from MLex.  Thank you so much for taking my question.  I wonder if you can elaborate a little bit on the national security risks at hand here.  The executive order, for example, cites the hacks of OPM and the hack of Anthem at the behest of Chinese hacking groups.  But I suppose you're not intimating that these apps are hacking into the devices of their users.  So there's no hacking going on here.  What's the national security risk?        SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Hi, Dave.  Thanks.  And it’s a great question.  I'm glad you asked it.  And what we’re really talking about here is the risks of giving exabytes of data, really granular data on the American people and people trusting the American, you know, commercial infrastructure with really sensitive information and handing that over to a totalitarian, fascist, technology-enabled dictatorship run by the Chinese Communist Party.         And if you look at what that totalitarian, fascist, technology-enabled communist dictatorship does, it uses mass amounts of information in order to control and oppress its people.  It oppresses -- it uses that data to oppress the Uighurs.  It uses that data to oppress the people of Hong Kong.  And it’s using that data to try and oppress peoples outside of Chinese geographic perimeter today in various countries.        And what we’re trying to do is articulate to the world and then take concrete steps here in the United States to stop the encroachment of China’s big-data strategy here in the United States and prevent the data of the American people and of their, you know, intimate information -- photos off of their phones, text messages, phone calls to their parents; maybe those parents are abroad, et cetera, et cetera -- from being fed into this mass tool for global oppression.         And so, you know, when you look at these applications, and when you look at the direction given to the Secretary of Commerce, what you see is one step among many that the President has taken over the past four years to fight back against that digital totalitarianism.  And here what we’re doing is blocking the transfer of really sensitive information from the American people and for people using American telecommunications networks and technologies from just being funneled into these terrifying databases that, as we see, they apply to more and more people every day.         And so, you know, I think it really -- I think every American ought to look at what these apps seek to do.  It’s just -- you know, there's a lot of it here in these materials, in terms of what happens when you allow these applications to gain access to your phone, what information they pass back, essentially to the Chinese Communist Party, to people that are by law -- by Chinese law required to comply with the secret directives of the Chinese Communist Party.         And, I mean, it’s really terrifying.  And not only is it terrifying, but it’s illiberal.  Right?  It essentially feeds them tools of mass oppression for billions of people worldwide.  And we’re just not interested in facilitating that.        SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Great.  Thanks very much, [senior administration official], and thanks, [senior administration official], for your answers.         And thanks, everyone, for participating here this evening.         Once again, just as a reminder, the ground rules that we stated at the top of the call: This is on background, attributed to a “senior administration official” or “senior administration officials.”        Thanks again, everyone.  And if you have other questions, please go ahead and email us through the NSC Press distro.  Thank you, Operator.                                          END          6:58 P.M. EST